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Pro-Constitutional Representation: Comparing the Role Obligations of 
Judges and Elected Representatives in Constitutional Democracy 
 
Vicki C. Jackson1 
 
 The role of the judge in a constitutional democracy has occupied the time and 
attention of lawyers, judges and law students for decades -- the concept of a 
representative, much less so.  Legal scholarship has constructed judging as both the 
problematic, in constitutional cases, and as the desideratum of lawmaking, in the case 
method and in the heroic conception of Herculean judges. Perhaps the leading concept in 
American constitutional theory in the last 65 years - the countermajoritarian difficulty - 
assumes it is the rule of the judge that requires an account.  And accounts have been 
given -- of great variety of great normative thickness, and contestedness -- and offered 
not only in constitution law courses but across a very wide spectrum of courses as the 
work of judges is evaluated.  
 
But the role of elected representatives has garnered far less scholarly and 
pedagogical attention in contemporary legal education.2 In part this may be because it 
appears normatively unproblematic; in a constitutional democracy by definition 
representatives have authority to act. But in a time of declining respect for legislatures 
                                                
1 This paper, which formed the basis for the Cutler Lecture given at William & Mary Law School, March 
__, 2015, was originally prepared for Princeton Con Law Schmooze, on “Democracy and Accountability,” 
December 7, 2012. With thanks for helpful comments from or conversations with Lori Andrews, 
Bernadette Atahueni,  Felice Batlan,William Birdthistle, Jamal Greene,  Jonathan Gould, Tara Grove, 
Gabor Halmai, [Sarah Harding?], Steven Jackson, Tsvi Kahana, Harold Krent, David Law, Clark 
Lombardi, David Fontana, Tara Grove, Edward Lee, Jayne Mansbridge, Martha Minow, David Pozen, 
Intisar Rabb., Todd Rakoff, Judith Resnik, Michael Seidman, Jamal Greene, Mark Rosen, Cesar Rosado, 
Michael Sandel, Fred Schauer, Kim Scheppele, Chris Schmitt, Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Joan Steinman, 
Mark Tushnet, Mila Versteeg, Robin West;  other participants in workshops at Harvard Law School, 
William and Mary Law School, Chicago Kent Law School, and the George Washington University Law 
School Comparative Constitutional Law Roundtable, and many others, none of whom bear any 
responsibility for errors of thought or accuracy or otherwise in this draft, which is my first effort to put 
something on paper about the subject.  I was aided by a number of talented law students, including Aaron 
Frumkin, Lauren Davis, Jason Schaffer, Ariel Giumarelli and Noah Marks. 
2 William and Mary Law School, founded by George Wythe, in its early years ran both a "moot court" and 
a "moot legislature" program, as Wythe apparently conceived of the school as training lawyers, judges and 
representative lawmakers. See Paul Heller, America's Legal History Started at Williamsburg, 2014 Library 
Staff Publications http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/libpubs/107; Paul D. Carrington, The Revolutionary Idea 
of University Legal education, 31 Wm & Mary L. Rev. 527, 534-36 (1990). Its role in preparing  future 
legislators was favorably noted by Thomas Jefferson. See id. at 536 (quoting Jefferson, in 1780, as saying 
"This single school by throwing from time to time new hands well principled and well informed into the 
legislature will be of infinite value.").  
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and widespread perception of a decline in Congress' ability to function as a lawmaker, 3  
those concerned with the basic functioning of American constitutional democracy can no 
longer afford to simply assume the unproblematical character of the legislator's role.  
 
  Judging and representing are two foundations of U.S. (indeed of any modern) 
constitutional democracy. Yet legal education neglects the subject of representation, 
which is a normatively more complex and demanding position in the U.S. federal system 
than is being a judge; in law schools it is, however, presented in narrow and normatively 
flat ways.  I discuss this in Part I. In recent years, some attention has been given to the 
role of representatives in interpreting constitutional law.4  But this growing literature has 
not taken on the larger task of offering a more general account of the normative 
expectations of elected representatives in a constitutional democracy. This paper aims to 
promote thinking and research in this area. Its claims are these: that the subject of 
representing subject is very neglected, in comparison to the enormous literature on the 
role of judging; that it is worth the effort to try to define the aspirations and 
responsibilities of a "conscientious" or "pro-constitutional" legislator in the U.S. 
constitutional democracy; and that the effort is worthy of consideration in law schools 
with possibly interesting payoffs in several areas.  
 
It is possible to develop and to teach a more complex normative account of 
representation, an account I would call the idea of a "pro-constitutional representative." 
Part II explains this concept, grounding it in the nature of an elected representative, the 
nature of a legislator, and the specific contours of the U.S. Constitution; it then  tries to 
define the aspirations and responsibilities of a "conscientious" or "pro-constitutional" 
legislator, especially in the national Congress. A pro-constitutional representative is not 
concerned only with interpreting specific provisions of the constitution, nor with assuring 
that legislation she promotes would meet constitutional standards. Rather a pro-
constitutional representative is one who more broadly to fulfill the complex and at times 
conflicting demands of "representing", in many ways a more demanding task than that of 
"interpreting" a legal instrument.  Representing requires not only presence but "acting," 
not only responding but initiating. Part II identifies some components of what such a 
more complex normative account would address; although these criteria may not be 
capable of definitive application in any specific instances, they provide useful parameters 
for evaluating representatives’ conduct as a whole.  The include elements on which there 
is probably widespread agreement -- such as providing information to, and receiving 
information from, constituents; and other elements, including a willingness to 
compromise, that I expect to be more controversial.   
 
Finally, in Part III, I return to why the subject is fit for law schools and worth the 
effort to better integrate attention to the normative qualities of good representatives, and 
                                                
3 See Gallup, Confidence in Institutions (2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-
institutions.aspx (reflecting that the public has the least confidence, of any institution surveyed about, in the 
Congress -- below the military, the Presidency, the Supreme Court; below small businesses, the police, 
churches, public schools, banks, organized labor; even below "big business."). 
4 The seminal article may well be Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional 
Interpretation, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 585 (1975).  
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good representative bodies.  On scholarship, thinking harder about what makes a good 
representative in a constitutional democracy sheds interesting light on comparative forms 
of representation; it may likewise shed light on interpretive theories based on deference 
to legislatures or ‘representation-reinforcement.’ On teaching, it may better prepare those 
law students who go on to be representatives to think complexly about their roles. And it 
may help raise the level of expectations of representatives in ways that would serve the 
public good.  
 
I. The Relative Neglect of the Normative Significance of Being a Representative in a 
Democracy. 
 
What happens when the Court decides a controversial issue? In District of 
Columbia v. Heller,5 for example, the Court, by a 5-4  vote, overruled an earlier decision 
and held that the Second Amendment guaranteed an individual right to possess weapons, 
especially in the context of weapons in the home suitable for self -defense.   There was 
public commentary and scholarship analyzing the opinions and their implications, the 
reasoning methods, the interpretive sources, and the consistency with which they were 
applied.  
 
 What happens when the Congress has a controversial issue before it - - a  recent 
instance involve the question of raising the debt ceiling to avoid default or harm to the 
U.S.' credit in 2011.6  Are there news articles analyzing the reasons for different Senators 
or Congressmen's positions? Typically not. Is there scholarly commentary on what 
different members of the legislature should do?  In that crisis, the dominant concern of 
legal scholarship for at least several months was whether the President could act on his 
own if Congress did not.7  Very little scholarship focused on the reasons for and conduct 
of the elected members of the Congress.  
 
 There are many reasons for this lopsided analytical focus.  For one thing, even 
when legislation is subject to constitutional challenge it is typically an executive branch 
officer who is the named party respondent; actions by the President or other executive 
officials is often subject to judicial review; inaction by the legislature is not.8  
 
The Supreme Court, moreover, is the head of a large judicial system in which 
principles of judicial hierarchy and stare decisis mean that what the Supreme Court says 
will have impacts on the decisions of many lower courts, state and federal.   Legislation is 
                                                
5 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) 
6 For description of this crisis, see, e.g., Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, How to Choose the Least 
Unconstitutional Option:  Lessons for the President (and Others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff, 112 
Colum. L. Rev. 1175 (2012);  Neil Buchanan and Michael Dorf, Nullifying the Debt Ceiling Threat Once 
and for All: Why the President Should Embrace the Least Unconstitutional Option, Columbia Law Review 
(Sidebar) (December 2012). 
7 See, e.g., Dorf & Buchanan (2012), supra note __.  
8 In some other constitutional systems actions for unconstitutional legislative omissions are recognized. See 
VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 831 (3d ed 2014) (noting 
Portugal's constitutional provision recognizing the court's power to control "unconstitutionality by 
omission" in failures of legislatures to act).  
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different.   Congress' relationships with the state legislature is not as directly hierarchical.  
And stare decisis as such does not exist for legislatures.  But still, a federal law has 
powerful preemptive force, controlling the actions of many officials and frequently of 
other persons as well.  
  
Another possible reason for the lopsided focus: there are many fewer judges on 
the Supreme Court than there are members of Congress.  Although there are about 1,000 
Article III judges altogether, there are only nine members of the Supreme Court - as 
compared to 435 members of the House and 100 in the Senate. In any given cases there is 
ordinarily no more than 2 to 5 judges on an appellate panel.  Even where a court of 
appeals sits "en banc," it sits with far fewer than the number of legislators.9  
 
A third reason for the difference in focus is that we are more sure we care about 
reason-giving in courts than about reason-giving in legislatures.  It is considered an 
obligation of appellate courts to give reasons explaining judgments; indeed, the 
obligation to give reasons is often considered a fundamental "check" on the power of the 
courts.10  But as far as legislatures go,  judges and jurists disagree about the need for and 
significance of reasons; they also disagree, for example about the role of so-called 
"legislative history, " in which arguments are often made about the reason for legislation 
and about legislators understandings of what the legislation is designed to accomplish.  
 
 A fourth difference -- and this is the one I want to focus on -- is that law schools 
and legal scholars have constructed judging as a focus of normative attention in a way 
that has not happened for representatives.  As noted above, in legal scholarship and law 
school teaching the role of the judge, of what is good judging, of legitimate approaches to 
interpretation, are studied frequently and from multiple perspectives.11 Judicial 
independence, its structures and meaning, are also the subject of study in multiple 
courses.  But legal education produces much richer understandings of normative demands  
and competing theories about what being a good judge means than about what being a 
good elected representative means.  Law schools and legal scholarship are filled to 
overflowing with normative accounts of judging.  Whether in the development of the 
common law, the interpretation of statutes, the decision of constitutional questions 
involving local or national laws, there are normatively thick, and nuanced, and competing 
and contested accounts of what “good” judging entails.  There is substantial agreement on 
some core attributes of judging – a set of “shalt nots” involving corrupt behavior or the 
allowance of certain forms of bias to intrude on judicial decisions. But there are also a 
                                                
9 See, e.g., Local Rules, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Rule 22.4(d) (providing for en banc review by 11 
judges, instead of the full 29 in the Ninth Circuit). By statute, the next largest court of appeals is the Fifth 
Circuit, with 17 judges, 28 U.S.C. 44; see also Fifth circuit Local Rule of Appellate Procedure 35.6  For the 
general rule on who can participate in en banc review, limiting it to the members in active service plus any 
senior judge who sat on the panel decision under review, see 28 U.S.C. 46 ( c ). 
10 See, e.g., Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 365-72 (1978); 
David L. Shapiro, In Defense  of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 , 747 (1987) (agreeing "with 
Lon Fuller that reasoned response to reasoned argument is an essential aspect of [the judicial] process"); 
see also  Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in A Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 18 (2001) 
11 See supra text at __.  
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number of “thou shalts” for being a good judge --   about the idea of impartiality (which 
mirrors, in a positive way, the prohibition of bias) and about accuracy and competence in 
understanding and applying the law, where there is clear law that controls decision.    
 
 There is much normative contest over other aspects of judging - - in interpreting 
statutes, for example, should the judge conceive herself to be the “faithful agent” of the 
legislatively enacted text?12  of the underlying legislative intent or overarching legislative 
purpose?13 should the judge see herself as a “junior partner” of the legislature, sensibly 
trying to fill in and make more coherent or normatively attractive a legislative scheme 
with its inevitable lacunae, potential inconsistencies and the like?14 Should approaches to 
statutory interpretation carry over to constitutional interpretation? What is the impact of 
the difficulty of amendment for constitutional interpretation?15  Can the text evolve over 
time as understandings change? Is there a stronger or weaker role for stare decisis in 
federal statutory, common law or constitutional cases? Is there a “countermajoritarian” 
difficulty to invoking judicial review in a democracy; if so, what are normatively 
appropriate responses to that difficulty?  original understandings or intent? the “Thayer” 
rule?16 John Hart Ely’s approach?17 an evolving meaning approach based on widespread 
understandings? a moral approach based on application of deep principles embodied by 
the constitution?18  These kinds of questions are posed to our students, again and again, in 
a variety of classes.  
 
 Other aspects of the normative role of judging may vary depending not on the 
subject matter but on the judge’s position in the court system: For trial courts, for 
example, what is the best normative balance between allowing lawyers to control the 
litigation and having the judge herself shape the litigation? This is highly contested, as 
are the benefits of “managerial” judging towards informal settlement as compared to 
public trials and more formal adjudication.19  On multimember courts, other normative 
debates exist about the role of principle and compromise. Most agree that overt log-
rolling is inconsistent with a judge’s job to be a “principled” decisionmaker. But should 
every disagreement result in a different opinion?20 Should “undertheorized” decisions 
that may lack analytical clarity but find agreement be favored over more analytically 
                                                
12 See generally John Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (2001). 
13 See generally William N. Eskridge Jr., and Philip P. Frickey, The Making of the Legal Process, 107 
Harv. L. Rev. 2013, 2037-xxxx (1994).  
14 See Daniel J. Meltzer. The Supreme Court's Judicial Passivity, 2002 Sup Ct Rev. 343. 
15 See Vicki C. Jackson, Democracy and Judicial Review, Will and Reason, Amendment and Interpretation: 
A Review of Barry Friedman's The Will of the People, 13 U. PA. J. Const. L.  413,  434-46 (2010).  
16 See Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2781 (2003).  
17 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (arguing for representation reinforcement as basis 
for judicial intervention) 
18 See, e.g,  RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
(1996).  
19 For description of the trend towards judges as managers of lawsuits and promoters of settlement, and 
critique of the abandonment of adjudication, see Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges,  96 Harv. L. Rev. 374 
(1982); Judith Resnik, Trial As Error, Jurisdiction As Injury: Transforming The Meaning Of Article III, 
113 Harv. L. Rev. 924 (2000) 




clear, or comprehensive treatments that results in more splintered courts?21   These 
questions are also ones that recur across the law school curriculum.  
  
 The work of democracy is typically done through processes that must be 
authorized by elected representatives. The size and scale of modern states make this a 
necessity; without representation, inclusion of multiple viewpoints in governance would 
be close to impossible. Indeed, some political scientists now view representative 
democracy as a "first-best", not "second-best" form of democratic governance.22 But in 
law schools, to the extent that we talk about the work of representatives in our classes on 
constitutional law, we tend to speak of the legislative body as a whole, with 
generalizations about what motivates the body to act; we do not, usually, focus on the 
role of a single representative himself, or herself.   And, with respect to 
legislator/legislature motivation, we tend to offer thin – and normatively unattractive or 
naive – accounts.  
 
With respect to judging and courts, law school classrooms are populated across 
subject areas with highly elaborated and nuanced normative aspirations for the role of 
constitutional judging, that may well be coupled with a skepticism about whether law, or 
principle “really matter” to judicial decisions.  In contrast to these richly elaborated 
normative theories about what good judges do and should do, the approach – in too many 
classrooms, and too much writing (my own included, I am sure) about legislatures and 
elected representatives  -- has been to veer from a highly formal "black box" of the 
“representative democratic process” under which it is simply presumed that legislation 
carries with it a democratic imprimatur of legitimacy (what Jane Schacter calls the 
"accountability axiom"),23 to a corrosive form of (pseudo?) realism, in which legislators 
are motivated, cynically, only by the desire to be re-elected and enjoy the accouterments 
of office,24 and statutes are regarded as the unfortunately “sausage-like” product of a 
cynical and unprincipled legislative process driven by concern for narrow (and campaign-
                                                
21 See Cass Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1996) 
22 See, e.g., NADIA URBINATI, REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 223-28 (2006). 
23 Richard Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking and the Constitution, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 191, 216 (2012) 
(describing "black box" of deliberative democracy in legislatures); Jane S. Schacter, Political 
Accountability, Proxy Accountability and the Democratic Legitimacy of Legislatures, in THE LEAST 
EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATe 45, 45 ("accountability 
axiom"). Schacter's work problematizes assumptions about the accountability resulting from democratic 
elections, both because of "deficits in accountability" arising from voters lack of knowledge and asymmetry 
in accountability because of disparities in the political process. Id. at 46; see also Jane Schacter, Ely and the 
Idea of Democracy, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 737 (2004).  
24 See Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lock Ups of the Democratic 
Process, 50 Stan L. Rev. 643, 649-50 (1998) ("[P]ublic choice theory defines the legislative process as an 
arena for fundamentally self-serving behavior as legislators trade off votes on specific legislation to 
advance their prospects for reelection."); see also id, 708-09. For a similar but less critical description of 
social choice theory in law, see e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice and the Legal Academy, 86 Geo. L. 
J. 1075 (1998) (reviewing Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos and Governance (1997)).  The reductionism of 
such theories has been subject to critique. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth Anderson, Slinging 
Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 Colum. L. 
Rev. 2121 (1990); Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and 
"Empirical' Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 Va. L. Rev. 199, 217-68 (1988). 
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contributing) interest groups.25 Such attitudes may be expressed both about hard-fought 
legislative compromises that pass by the slimmest of majorities and about legislation that 
is passed by substantial majorities; or about legislation rushed through a Congress with 
little deliberation or legislation that culminates a multi-year process of legislative 
factfinding.   
 
  In addition to the “legitimate democratic will” version of legislation, and the 
public choice “rational actor” model of the representative who seeks to maximize only 
his or her own reelection (or other self-interested gain), there is on occasion in law school 
classrooms a recognition of the various collective choice problems of legislative 
decisionmaking, which can explain how, even with legislators acting in good faith, 
legislation may be enacted that does not represent the views or preferences of a 
majority.26 (Such moves may be invoked, for example, to help to explain why courts 
invalidating of laws may not be ‘countermajoritarian,’ or to problematize the concept of a 
“legislative intent” or “purpose” that can guide statutory interpretation.)  But these are 
positive propositions; they do not contribute in any direct way to a normative account of 
what a good representative in a constitutional democracy should do, in light of such 
collective action (and other) problems.   
 
 The 2012 Foreword to the Harvard Law Review, written by Pam Karlan, develops 
the theme that the current majority of the Court shows “contempt” for the democratic 
branches.27  Disdain for or distrust of the most representative branch is pervasive.28  
When we assume in our teaching that members of the legislature are motivated only by a 
desire for re-election, do we implicitly convey a degree of normative disdain?  One might 
think that the motivation to be reelected is an essential constitutional mechanism of 
democratic accountability.  Why, then, should such motivations be viewed only as a 
negative fact about representatives?29  
                                                
25 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION 61-63 (2007) (discussing "rent extraction" as legislative activity but arguing that "it accepts 
the inaccurate view of legislators as one-dimensional seekers of financial rewards from special interest 
groups . . . although reelection and interest group considerations are important to lawmakers, most are also 
pursuing other objectives, such as affecting policy in ways consistent with their ideological commitments"). 
The challenges of aggregating group preferences, as explored by public choice theorists, may also limit the 
fairness and coherence attainable even by sincerely motivated collective decision-makers. 
26 See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123 Harv L Rev 4, 11-12 
(2009) (explaining Arrow's theorem) 
27 Pamela Karlan, Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1, xx (2012). 
28 See supra note [Gallup poll]The phenomenon of publics having greater trust in their constitutional courts 
than in their legislatures is not limited to the United States. See David Law, Theory of Judicial Power and 
Judicial Review, 97 Geo. L. J. 723, XXX (2009). 
29 Gerrymandering, the impact of money on elections, and the need for tremendous amounts fundraising all 
help account for some of the negative views of federal legislators. I do not disagree with those who view 
the current financing system and its reliance on large donors as corrosive (for varying accounts, see, e,g, 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST (year)]; Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 Cornell 
L. Rev. 341 (2009); Samuel Issachoroff, On Political Corruption, 124 Harv L Rev 118 (2010); see also 
Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking and the Constitution, supra note__ at 221-22  (noting lobbyists' raising 
campaign contributions as way to gain aces to legislators and noting risks of lobbying producing "rent-
seeking" legislation), nor that the drawing of district lines could better be performed by nonpartisan actors, 




Constitutional Law  casebooks almost always include Marbury v Madison, 
framed, at least in part, by a discussion of what it is the “judiciary” and its judges 
necessarily do and ought to be doing.  Many Con Law books return, repeatedly, to 
questions of interpretation (which are presumptively about “good” judging as well). But 
how many Con Law casebooks introduce students to debates between Burkean (or 
“republican”) views of the representative as a “trustee”, obligated to exercise independent 
judgment in voting (considering constituents’ views but not treating them as dispositive), 
and more pluralist, interest-group accounts in which a good representative ought to act 
more as the “delegate” and advance primarily the interests or views of her constituency?  
Even in the Brest-Levinson casebook, known for its innovative approach in including 
non-judicial materials of constitutional interpretation, there is little effort to explore the 
ways in which being a representative matter to the nature of the constitutional 
interpretation that is offered.30  And there is little attention paid in constitutional law 
                                                                                                                                            
accountability, see Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 593 
(2002).  Nor do I disagree that representation may reflect racism, and other forms of injustice, in ways that 
warrant attention to the inclusiveness of legislatures vis -a-vis disadvantaged social groups. See IRIS 
MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 121-153 (2000); Melissa Williams, The Uneasy Alliance of 
Group Representation and Deliberative Democracy, in CITIZENSHIP IN DIVERSE SOCIETIES 131-144 (Will 
Kymlicka and Wayne Norman eds. 2000);  cf. e.g., John E. Romer, Why does the Republican Party Win 
Half the Votes?, in POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 316-21 (Ian Shapiro et al eds. 2009))(exploring inter alia 
"-race-based" and "anti-solidarity"  effects). Rather, I seek here to argue the benefits of articulating a 
normatively complex account of the role of legislators that recognizes that they are not supposed to behave 
like judges, that their obligations under the Constitution are different; and that the “representative” 
character includes a normatively attractive element of responsiveness to electoral constituencies.  
30 Thus, the Brest Levinson casebook as of its Fifth Edition, BREST, ET AL, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DECISION-MAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed 2006), includes legislative forms of constitutional 
interpretation (e.g. id at 88-93, nullification expressed in state legislatures; 28-32, views of Rep. James 
Madison in Congress on the national bank), forms of interpretation offered by Presidents (e.g., 64-65, 
Jefferson on acquiring Louisiana, 71-79, Andrew Jackson on the national bank) and  (261-69, Lincoln as 
President on secession vs Judah Benjamin, as he left the Senate),  Cabinet members (e.g, the Attorney 
General, and the Secretary of the Treasury, on the National Bank, at 332-33, 34-37), presidential candidates 
(e.g., 257-60, Lincoln-Douglas debates),  members of the Cabinet (e.g., by social movements (e.g., 166-68, 
Seneca Falls declaration) and by influential individuals (e.g., Frederick Douglass, 253-57), in addition to 
cases decided by courts. But this wonderful book does not include material reflecting on the nature of being 
a representative, in some contrast with material understandably devoted to the role of courts in 
constitutional review – including but not limited to Marbury. See id. at 108-23.  Casebooks	  on	  legislation	  are	  another	  place	  where	  attention	  to	  the	  role	  of	  legislators	  might	  be	  expected.	  Yet	  even	  here,	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  relatively	  little	  attention	  to	  the	  normative	  obligations	  of	  legislators.	  	  The	  Hart	  &	  Sacks,	  Legal	  Process	  material	  devotes	  attention	  to	  the	  functions	  carried	  out	  in	  legislatures	  (e.g.,	  legislating,	  oversight,	  constituent	  service),	  but	  not	  to	  the	  normative	  obligations	  of	  legislators	  as	  such. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (1994). The	  Eskridge-­‐Frickey	  casebook	  discussed	  legislators'	  obligations	  to	  assure	  themselves	  of	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  legislation,	  under	  precedents	  established	  by	  courts.	  See	  WILLIAM	  N.	  ESKRIDGE,	  JR.,	  PHILIP	  P.	  FRICKEY,	  ELIZABETH	  GARRETT,	  CASES	  AND	  MATERIALS	  ON	  LEGISLATION	  428-­‐35	  (2007).	  	  The	  Manning-­‐Stephenson	  casebook	  considers	  whether	  legislators	  are	  aware	  of	  judicial	  canons	  of	  interpretation.	  	  JOHN	  F.	  MANNING	  &	  MATTHEW	  C.	  STEPHENSON,	  LEGISLATION	  AND	  REGULATION	  280-­‐81	  (2013)	  William	  Popkin's	  book	  on	  legislation	  consider	  electoral	  incentives	  of	  legislators,	  e.g.,	  whether	  voters	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  blame	  than	  give	  credit,	  and	  the	  incentives	  for	  risk-­‐averse	  behavior	  this	  creates.	  WILLIAM	  D.	  POPKIN,	  MATERIALS	  ON	  LEGISLATION	  146-­‐50	  (2009).	  See	  also	  	  FRANK C. NEWMAN & STANLEY S. 
SURREY, LEGISLATION CASES AND MATERIALS (1955). Of	  the	  casebooks	  on	  legislation	  reviewed,	  some	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books or teaching to the positive duties that legislators may have  -- to act, positively, to 
give effect to constitutional vision(s) of the legislative role,31  or to the question whether 
there are competing normative theories of the role of representative (as there are with 
judging) and whether there are shared elements to those different visions (as with 
judging).   
 
 It is understandable that a constitutional law course would focus most attention on 
the meaning of the Constitution’s provisions in contested cases. But in law school, across 
the curriculum, much more attention is paid to what courts do – to how they are 
constructed and selected, to who the judges are, to judicial behavior at the trial and 
appellate level, to different styles of judicial reasoning and argument – than is paid to 
comparable questions about legislatures.  That is, we build a stronger positive foundation 
for normative reflection on judging than we do for normative reflections about the nature 
of being a representative.  
 
 It may be that it is not in law schools that the most normative attention should be 
given to the nature of representation; perhaps the role of representatives and the making 
of statutes in legislative bodies should be treated as subjects for government departments, 
and the application and interpretation of laws once made for the law schools.  But this 
does not seem in fact to describe the law school curriculum, much of which is devoted to 
questions of reforming laws, which often (and necessarily) contemplate legislation.  What 
is lacking, however, is a focus on representation, on trying to develop a complex set of 
                                                                                                                                            did	  at	  least	  briefly	  include	  materials	  relevant	  to	  the	  normative	  self-­‐understanding	  of	  the	  legislator's	  role.	  OTTO	  J.	  HETZEL,	  MICHAEL	  E.	  LIBONATI,	  ROBERT	  F.	  WILLIAMS,	  LEGISLATIVE	  LAW	  AND STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 81-88 (2008),	  refers	  to	  the	  question	  whether	  a	  representative	  sees	  herself	  as	  a	  Burkean	  "trustee"	  for	  the	  people,	  acting	  independently	  of	  their	  views	  in	  the	  long	  term	  interest	  of	  the	  whole,	  or	  rather	  sees	  herself	  as	  a	  "delegate,"	  to	  advance	  the	  known	  current	  interests	  of	  the	  represented;	  	  the	  same	  source	  [at	  least	  in	  earlier	  edition,	  check	  if	  still	  in	  2008]	  also	  is	  the	  only	  one	  of	  these	  casebooks	  to	  refer	  to	  four	  categories	  of	  "representation"	  made	  famous	  by	  HANNAH	  FENICHEL	  PITKIN,	  CONCEPT	  OF	  REPRESENTATION	  (1967)	  -­‐-­‐	  formal	  representation	  based	  on	  authority,	  descriptive	  representation,	  symbolic	  representation,	  and	  substantive	  representation	  (acting	  for	  and	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  those	  represented).	  	  A	  quite	  new	  casebook	  does,	  importantly,	  raise	  in	  the	  first	  chapter	  questions	  about	  how	  judges,	  legislators,	  and	  administrators	  think	  about	  statutes;	  and	  with	  respect	  to	  legislators,	  makes	  the	  important	  point	  –one	  central	  to	  this	  paper	  -­‐-­‐	  	  that	  legislators,	  unlike	  judges,	  “represent	  the	  public”	  and	  openly	  seek	  compromise.	  	  WILLIAM	  N.	  ESKRIDGE,	  JR.,	  ABBE	  GLUCK,	  VICTORIA	  F.	  NOURSE,	  STATUTES,	  REGULATIONS	  AND	  INTERPRETATION:	  LEGISLATION	  AND	  ADMINISTRATION	  IN	  THE	  REPUBLIC	  OF	  STATUTES	  11	  (2014);	  see	  also	  ABNER	  J.	  MIKVA	  AND	  ERIC	  LANE	  ,LEGISLATIVE	  PROCESS	  26-­‐27,	  444-­‐47	  (referring	  to	  compromise	  as	  "the	  heart	  of	  the	  legislative	  process",	  and	  briefly	  discussing	  the	  representatives'	  relationship	  	  with	  those	  represented	  including	  references	  to	  the	  delegate	  and	  trustee	  theories.	  	  For	  further	  discussion	  of	  casebooks,	  see	  infra	  at	  __	  (noting	  Pamela	  Karlan,	  Samuel	  Issacharoff	  and	  Richard	  Pildes,	  THE	  LAW	  OF	  DEMOCRACY).	  	  
31 The range of academic literature is broader than what goes on in our classrooms. Some, like Robin West, 
have argued that legislators do have constitutional duties to fulfill constitutional norms. See, e.g., Robin 
West, Tom Paine's Constitution, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1413 (2003) discussion below.  Beyond West’s own 
account of what she sees as constitutional obligations to provide for far greater equality than currently 
exists, the claim I am advancing here is that whatever the legislator, or her constituents, believe the 
constitutional vision is – whether of a night watchman state or to advance a socially egalitarian society – 
legislators may have obligations derived in part from being elected, in part from being elected under the 
Constitution,  to act in certain ways in their capacity as constitutional and democratically elected 
representatives to advance that normative vision.  
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normative discourses around representation that might offer an aspirational 
counterbalance (which understands that legislators’ obligations are different from judges) 
to the more cynical of accounts, and better inform law school discussions of the 
relationships between legislatures, courts, administrative agencies and other actors in the 
constitutional system. 
 
II. Elected Representatives Should Be Understood to have Pro-Constitutional 
Obligations to Act to Promote Working Government 
 
 This silence is concerning. One of the lessons from a comparative study of 
constitutional systems is the importance of what one might call “pro-constitutional” 
aspirations, attitudes, and behaviors, by democratically elected representatives, as well as 
other actors throughout the institutions of constitutional democracy and enough portions 
of civil society and popular culture.  I use the term "pro-constitutional," not to refer to 
any specific obligation of constitutional interpretation that legislators may have, but 
rather to call attention to their central constitutional role as legislators in a constitutional 
democracy.    
 
Being an elected representative in a lawmaking body is a normatively very 
challenging task, given the competing demands - - widely recognized – between short- 
term electoral accountability, which has deeply attractive and important aspects in a 
constitutional democracy, and the long term public good (of both particular 
constituencies and the country as a whole), also a good thing in a constitutional 
democracy.  As Nadia Urbinati has written, "if representatives are to be judged, there 
should be a norm of 'good' representation."32 But the norms of being a good 
representative are quite different than for being a good judge. For example, unlike judges 
who, no matter how chosen, are supposed to act impartially in adjudication, legislators 
are elected as representatives of particular constituencies, on whose behalf they are 
supposed to act, at least part of the time; elected representative, unlike judges,  should not 
necessarily aim to be principled and consistent in all their work on legislation, given the 
need to work with others to get anything done; unlike judges, legislators are not expected 
individually to give reasons for most of their actions; unlike federal life-tenured judges, 
for whom reason-giving is a central form of public accountability, legislators must 
regularly stand for election where what the public views as their product can in theory be 
evaluated.  Both the need for “pro-constitutional” understandings of the functions of 
being a "good" representative and the (potential) complexity of what those 
understandings are is underappreciated.  
 
 A. Why the term "pro-constitutional"? 
 
 Before trying to say more about the attitudes and qualities of a "pro-constitutional' 
legislator, a few words on the term "pro-constitutional" may be helpful.  Is the idea of a 
"pro-constitutional" representative any different from the idea of a "good legislator"?  
What obligations inhere in being a representative in a constitutional democracy? Are 
                                                
32 NADIA URBINATI, REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 218 (2006, 2008) 
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there obligations that flow from the U.S. Constitution that affect the role of an individual 
representative in the U.S. Congress? Why the term, "pro-constitutional"? 
 
It is the Constitution that provides for the selection of representatives by popular 
election. In so doing, the Constitution prescribes that the principal law makers  of the 
government are directly chosen in democratic elections.33 Over time the U.S. 
commitment to an inclusive notion of the democratic electorate has expanded in the 
Constitution,34 accentuating the role of elections in legitimizing government law-making.  
The representatives' relationship to those who elect him or her is at the heart of U.S. 
constitutional government.35 Representative legislatures stand for the proposition that the 
laws under which we are governed must rest on the consent of the governed, given 
through their election of the lawmakers and the need for those lawmakers to stand 
regularly for election.36 In order for that consent to be meaningful, there are requirements 
of publicity and transparency so that the people can know and understand the significance 
of what their representatives have done.37 
 
                                                
33 U.S. Const. art I; Amend. XVII.  
34 See U.S. Const. Amends. XV, XVII, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.  
35 See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, REPRESENTATION IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 70-71 (revised ed 2008) 
("Representation … was the key in unlocking an understanding of the American political system."); 
Edward Rubin, Judicial Review and the Right to Resist, 97 Geo L J 61, 103 ("[T]he essence of our system 
is representation; the people elect representatives and the representatives constitute the ruler. This is not an 
unfortunate compromise with inconveniences of mass society, but an epochal innovation by the Western 
world in the art of governance."); Mark Rosen, The Structural Constitutional Principle of Republican 
Legitimacy, 54 Wm & Mary L Rev 371 (2012) (arguing that the Constitution embodies a structural 
principle of "republican legitimacy," which includes the idea that the selection method for representatives 
must be legitimate, providing a fair mechanism for expression of the people's choice in competitive 
elections). [Cf.  Jeremy Webber, Democratic Decision Making as the First Principle of Contemporary 
Constitutionalism, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH 411 (Richard W. Bauman and Tsvi Kahana eds 2006) 
("[D]emocratic participation…is the first principle of contemporary constitutionalism.") 
36 It is not the case in all constitutional democracies that the legislature is the principal lawmaking body. 
Although usually this is so, in the current, Fifth French Republic the legislators act in the domain of "lois," 
but the President has authority to issue "reglements" - and the legislature is prohibited to enact laws in the 
domain of the President's authority over reglements or regulation.  See ALEC STONE,  THE BIRTH OF 
JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE XXX (1992); Constitution of the Fifth French Republic (1958) Arts. 37 (all 
matters other than those designated for statute law come within the domain of regulation); see also articles 
34 (listing the domains of legislation); 41 (giving Constitutional Council jurisdiction to rule on whether a 
proposal for a statute is unconstitutional insofar as it is "not a matter for statute" but intrudes on the domain 
of regulation); 47-1 (providing for finance bills to come into legal effect through regulation if parliament 
fails to take a decision within 70 days); 47-2 (same for social security bills after 50 days). So the fact that in 
the United States, the "legislative" power is vested in a Congress made up of elected representatives,  and 
includes the power to make all laws necessary and proper to carry out its legislative powers and the powers 
delegated to other organs of the national government, tightly links elected representatives in the legislature 
to lawmaking.  
37 On the importance of free access to information to representative government, see generally Bernard 
Manin, et al, Introduction, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND REPRESENTATION 23-24 (Adam 
Przeworski et al eds. 1999). See also Jeremay Waldron, Legislating with Integrity, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 
373, 379 (2003); Jonathan R. Macey, Cynicism and Trust in Politics and Constitutional Theory, 87 Corn. 
L. Rev. 280, 284, 306-07 (2002) (arguing that "contestability", i.e., competitive elections, and "unbiased 
widely available sources of information" that can be integrated into political discourse are necessary to 
sustain accountable and public-interested government).  
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Second, and in addition to the idea of being the principal lawmakers under the 
Constitution, the broader idea of being a "representative" is invoked, explicitly by the 
term used for membership in the House and implicitly by the term used for membership 
in the Senate. Although the term "representative" and the idea of representation has many 
forms, it is a role distinct from being a "judge."38 Which of its many meanings is most 
appropriate depends in part on the fact of having been elected, in part on the fact of being 
elected to serve in the legislature of a constitutional democracy, and in part on the fact of 
being elected to serve in the particular legislature constituted by the Constitution and 
laws of the United States. By virtue of being elected, it can be argued, representatives 
assume an implicit obligation of faithful service to their constituencies, which at a 
minimum means they are to act so as to promote the public good, not private interest.39   
Being a pro-constitutional representative refers not only to the obligations of 
representatives to interpret specific provisions of the constitution as they are relevant to 
their official duties - though it would include that - -but also and more generally 
encompasses obligations of serving as a representative under the Constitution.   
 
 At least three animating ideas of the Constitution are relevant: workable 
government; constitutional loyalty; and representative legitimacy.  First, an important 
goal of the Constitution was to create an effective, working government.40  The Articles 
of Confederation were regarded, by those motivated to come to Philadelphia in the 
summer of 1787, as unworkable; major legislation and spending required a super-
majority vote of the states,41 which was often difficult to obtain; states failed to meet 
obligations to fund the national government; the national government lacked power to 
regulate its citizens directly, to prevent ruinous economic wars between the states, and to 
protect the interests of the United States in the international sphere; and amendments 
were essentially impossible as unanimity was required.42  The government lacked an 
executive head, making expeditious and effective action extremely difficult.43  The 
                                                
38 Being a representative as the principal role of a government actor is different from the adjectivally 
"representative" characteristics of all government actors. All organs of government can be "representative" 
of the people, or of their country, in some ways; but the job title representative connotes a different set of 
responsibilities than the job title of being a judge.  In Hannah Pitkin's terms, all members of the government 
can be "representative" in a "symbolic" or "descriptive" sense; but it is the elected representatives --in both 
the legislature, with which I am concerned her, or the executive -- who "act for" the people as their direct 
representatives. HANNAH FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION XX (19xx).  
39 See T. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 Harv. L. Rev.  671 (2013);  Robert G. Natelson, 
The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 Buff. L. Rev. 1077 (2004) (discussing the framers’ conceptions 
of public officials’ fiduciary duties);  Evan Fox-Decent, The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal Authority, 31 
Queens L.J. 259 (2005) ; Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 
101 Calif. L. Rev.  699, 710-12 (2013) (noting public officials fiduciary duties); David L. Ponet & Ethan J. 
Leib, Fiduciary Law’s Lessons for Deliberative Democracy, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 1249 (2011)]. 
40 See, e.g., Federalist No. 70, at 422 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (necessity of an 
"energetic executive") 
41 See Articles of Confederation, art IX (requiring vote of nine states for many actions). 
42 See generally JACK RAKOVE,  ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION XX-XX  (1996) For a characterization of governance under the Articles as one of See 
generally , see Teter, supra [infra] note __, 2013 Wis. L. rev. at ___  
43 See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 [466-67, 550-51] 




national government was a quite limited, and quite checked one, but it was also widely 
seen as ineffective. Thus, an important motivating force for adoption of the Constitution 
was to create an effective, working government; and the extent to which it did so has 
contributed to its endurance over time. Members of a U.S. government thus have some 
obligation to maintain a working government, consistent with the spirit of the 
Constitution.44  
 
Second, all elected officials and judges in the United States, including Members 
of Congress, are required by the Constitution to take an oath or make an affirmation to 
support the Constitution.45   Although many national constitutions require such an oath, 
not all do; in Canada, for example, the oath that is taken swears allegiance to the monarch 
without reference to the constitution.46  The idea of the Oath or Affirmation clause of 
Article VI of the Constitution is one of loyalty to the Constitution as a whole.47 The idea 
of loyalty to the Constitution bears some resemblance to doctrines in other countries: In 
Germany the Constitutional Court has found an unwritten constitutional doctrine of 
"bundestreue" -- which is sometimes translated as "pro-federal loyalty."48 Although no 
                                                
44 See, e.g., David Pozen, Self Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 Yale L J 2, 75-76 (2014) ( principle 
of working and effective government); cf. Benjamin Ewing and Douglas A.. Kyar, Prods and Pleas: 
Limited Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 Yale L. J. 350 (2011) (arguing that "liberal anxiety 
today should focus not just on whether our system of checks and balances can safely constrain collective 
political action, but also on whether the system can ensure that collective action does happen when it is 
necessary;" and suggesting that the different organs of government in a divided government constitution 
can take action designed to "prod" others into action that is needed but not being taken, using as example 
litigation over climate change);  Richard H. Pildes, Political Avoidance, Constitutional Theory, and the 
VRA, 117 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 148, 148 (2007), http:// yalelawjournal.org/2007/12/10/pildes.html. 
(arguing that "in modern political practice, the flight from political responsibility--the problem of political 
abdication-- is at least as serious a threat” as that of expansion of legislative and executive power).  
45 U.S. Const. art VI cl. 3 ("The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the 
several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the 
several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution…")., See Rosen, supra 
note __, at 378 (on significance of oath in committing officials to principle of "republican legitimacy").  
46 See Michel Bedard and James Robertson, Oaths in the Canadian House of Commons, at 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/bp241-e.ht.  Section 128 of the Constitution Act, 
1867 provides  that every member of the House of Commons and of the provincial legislatures must take an 
oath, set forth in Schedule 5,  which provides "I, A.B. do swear, That I will be faithful and bear true 
Allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Victoria." (A note to the Schedule also provides for substitution of the 
name of the King or Queen, as appropriate.)  Bedard and Robertson, supra, write: "As can be seen, the oath 
is one of allegiance to the monarch, not to Canada or the Canadian Constitution."  
47 See Vicki C Jackson, Pro-constitutional behavior, political actors, independent courts: A Comment on 
Geoffrey Stone's Paper, 2 I.CON 368, 3--, 376 (2004) ("[P]olitical actors play a key role in developing and 
sustaining constitutionalism by their decisions to engage in … 'proconstitutional' behavior." And defining 
proconstitutional behavior as " behavior that may not be expressed in terms required by the constitution but 
that has the purpose and effect of facilitating implementation of  constitutional values and commitments").  
In that paper I called for the development of a constitutional jurisprudence for nonjudicial actors, id., 
towards which the instant paper represents an effort.   
48 See Jackson,  Pro-constitutional behavior, supra note 4, at 378   ("[T]he idea of governmental duties to 
behave in particular ways, even if not fully judicially enforceable, is no stranger to modern constitutional 
discourse … ."). On Germany and "bundestreue," see DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 61-75 (2d ed. 1997) (using word “profederal” as 
translation of “Bundestreue” in Television I case, 12 BverfG 205 (1961), and elsewhere defining 
Bundestreue as a “principle of federal comity”); see also DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
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doctrine of comparable force has been articulated in the United States by the Courts, as 
Daniel Halberstam has shown the idea of something like a reciprocal loyalty among parts 
to the whole has long been articulated in some U.S. federalism cases.49  The structure of 
the Constitution includes checks and balances, but it also separates powers into different 
roles to enhance the workability of government. Such unwritten implications from the 
constitution and its structures to impose duties of good faith and fair dealing on parts of 
the government existing in other constitutional system as well, including Canada.50  The 
standards of being a "pro-constitutional" legislator will not necessarily give rise to 
justiciable claims, since the obligation are not limited to conforming to specific 
constitutional requirements or prohibitions but more broadly embrace how the role of 
representation is carried out.  Some important textual provisions have been found 
nonjusticiable,51 and others, we know, are "under-enforced."52 But what the Constitution 
requires to work goes well beyond the group of issues that the courts can adjudicate. The 
oath may, indeed, be thought of as an additional, "soft" enforcement mechanism, on the 
premise that men and women will generally take seriously the obligations they publicly 
avow (or take them more seriously than without such a public vow).53  
 
 Third, the constitution plainly makes elected representation a central pillar of the 
legitimacy of government.  As noted earlier, the legitimacy derives from their being 
elected and implies  a set of relationships and obligations to one's constituents. But the 
idea of being elected to act as representatives in a collegial lawmaking body in a way 
faithful to the Constitution might also carry with it other implication, of behaving in a 
way that is faithful to, recognizes,  the democratic pedigree of the other members of the 
body.  Other members are not enemies, but the opposition, participating ,jointly with the 
                                                                                                                                            
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 77–80 (1994)  (treating Bundestreue as a “constitutional analog of the 
general civil-law duty of an obligor to act in good faith").  
49 Daniel Halberstam,  Of Power and Responsibility: The Political Morality of Federal Systems, 90 Va. L. 
Rev. 731, ---, 801, 802-16 (2004) ( arguing that although the U.S. Constitution has not been interpreted by 
the Court to establish a general duty of fidelity to "hold the system of divided power together,"  and is said 
to rely instead on checks and balances, "a constitutionally grounded concern for the common enterprise is 
more than occasionally discernible" as in the application of "proper purpose" requirements to taxing and 
spending measures, intergovernmental immunities, and in dormant commerce clause caselaw) 
50 Thus, in the Secession Reference case, [1998]  2 S.C.R. 217 (Canada), the Supreme Court of Canada 
drew on unwritten constitutional principles (as it has in a number of other cases) to resolve questions about 
the legality of a unilateral secession.  After concluding that a unilateral secession would not be 
constitutional, it also concluded that if by a clear vote a clear majority in one province wanted 
independence, a duty would arise for the rest of Canada to discuss this with the province.  Implementation 
of duty, the Court said, would be for the political organs of government to work out.. The duty, then, was 
only in part justiciable. 
51 See, e.g., Luther v Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849) {Guarantee Clause); Pacific States Tel & Telegraph Co v. v. 
Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (the referendum cases); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) 
(public accounts of spending clause). Cf. Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term--Foreword: 
The Court's Agenda--And the Nation's, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (2006) (arguing that much of what concerns the 
public, and much of the Constitution, involve nonjusticiable issues).  
52 On under-enforcement of constitutional norms, see LAWRENCE SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES (2004).  
53 See Sujit Choudhry, Popular Revolution or Popular Constitutionalism, in THE LEAST EXAMINED 
BRANCH, supra note __, 480, 488 (explaining that the Secession Reference case "held that the rules were 
both nonjusticiable and legally binding"). A public oath might also be conceived as an explicit invitation to 
the public and other constitutional actors to evaluate fidelity to the oath. 
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majority in the governance project; and a healthy opposition is a necessary component of 
what Rosen calls the "republican legitimacy" of the government under the constitution.   
 
 Many aspects of constitutional structure may affect the role obligations of 
representatives. Two specific aspects of the U.S. Constitution not already mentioned 
reinforce the idea that representatives have duties, beyond loyalty to the Constitution and 
to their constituents: For one thing, the role of representative can be more or less 
independent, during the term of office, from the constituency. In some jurisdictions 
elected representatives may be given "instructions" by their constituents, which they are 
obligated to implement; or are subject to recall elections before their term is over. The 
U.S. Congress is constituted in a way that is more independent. No provision in the 
Constitution was made either for binding mandates from the people to their 
representatives, nor for recall of representatives during the term authorized by the 
Constitution.54 These decisions reflect an effort to insulate members of Congress from 
immediate passions and interests and to promote deliberative decision-making - in a 
process involving other representatives from other states and localities.55 There may thus 
be a basis for thinking there is a duty to consider the arguments of others in the Congress: 
independence during the term of elected office implies, as well, the national and local 
character of the role of representative: duties to a constituency but also duties to the 
national polity, of which the deliberative process in Congress assembled is an expression.   
 
Second, the role of representative may differ in a parliamentary and presidential 
system. For example, in a parliamentary system if the membership looses confidence in 
the head of government it is entirely appropriate that they so indicate and resort to new 
elections.  But in a presidential system the president is elected separately from the 
members of the legislature; his (or her) legitimacy is not derivative of the legislatures but 
is in practice as directly from the people as are members of the legislature.  And, as the 
U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized, the President is the only elected official who can 
speak for the whole people.56  Members of Congress, then, may have a duty to recognize 
the President's democratic legitimacy and to work with him or her in making the 
                                                
54 See CASS SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY 41 (2001) (noting "the framers' explicit rejection of the 
'right to instruct' representatives" and emphasizing the importance of deliberation in public decision-
making); Jack Maskell, Recall of Legislators and Removal of Members of Congress from Office, 
Congressional Research Service Report, at 5-7 (noting deliberate decision by the Framers not to include 
provisions, which had been considered, for recalling members of Congress from service and distinguishing 
Articles of Confederation under which delegates to the Continental Congress were subject to both 
instruction and recall). See also THOMAS CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY 128-32 (1989) (arguing that 
rejection of right to recall at time the Constitution was ratified represented a conscious effort to remedy 
defects of Articles of Confederation (which permitted recall), both in failing to have sufficiently national 
views in the legislature and from excess attention to "shortsighted" passions of the people in their states).  
But while the rejection of recall and instruction reflects a desire for national and independent views, the 
allocation of representation represented a rejection of the idea that "virtual" representation, divorced from 
particular interests of particular constituencies, was democratically legitimate. See generally WOOD, 
REPRESENTATION IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra note __ . History and constitutional structure thus 
emphasize the complexity of the role of representative reflected in the U.S. constitution. 
55 It is worth noting that each House was authorized to expel members but only by a two-thirds vote, U.S. 
Const. art I Section __, also a form of protection for the independence of members within the body. 
56 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export,  Corp, 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (quoting John Marshall in 
the U.S. House of Representatives); Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S Ct 2076, 2088-89 (2015). 
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government work for his term of office in a way that differs from legislature's 
relationships to Prime Ministers in parliamentary systems.57  
 
 In sum, just as the idea of being a good federal judge draws in part on general 
concepts of the role of being a judge,58 in part on the obligations of judging in a 
constitutional democracy,59 and in part on the specific structures of the U.S. 
Constitution,60 so too, does the idea of a "pro-constitutional representative"  draw on the 
general role of an elected representative, on the role of legislators in constitutional 
democracies, and -- when discussing U.S. representatives --  on more specific aspects of 
the U.S. Constitution.61  
 
B. Pro-Constitutional Representatives As Actors Motivated by the Public Good 
and Elected to Serve the Public Good in Ways Connected to their Constituency 
 
Why do people run for office in the first place?   Although the empirical political 
science literature seems to be dominated by a model that focuses on legislative votes, and 
what public opinion polls show about voter preferences, more normatively focused 
political scientists acknowledge that representatives have opportunities to contribute to or 
reshape, as well as simply to express or go along with, public views.  Their motivation to 
reshape public opinion cannot be accounted for simply by a motive to be re-elected. Is the 
dominant model that we in law school classrooms do impart – of self-interested 
representatives who collectively, and unpleasantly, produce the laws -- an adequately 
complete description of what representatives actually do, and care about, across the range 
of legislative tasks?62 Of their opportunities to shape the sphere of “public affairs,” their 
capacity to form as well as to express or act on the preferences of their constituents?63   
Does a motivation to be re-elected really explain or account for the range of activities and 
the range of normative goals a good representative might have? 
 
                                                
57 Mitch McConnell, as Senate Minority leader, "summed up his plan to National Journal: “The single most 
important thing we want to achieve is for President Obama to be a one-term president.” Andy Barr, "John 
Boehner: 'We Will Not Compromise'", Politico (Oct 26 2010), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1010/44311.html. While perfectly legitimate as a political goal, it is 
arguably inconsistent with the duty to work with the elected president on behalf of the people for this to be 
the opposition's "most important thing" to achieve.  
58 Most of the ethical rules believed generally to apply to judges also apply ro federal judges - norms of 
impartiality, of not having a personal financial interest in a matter under decision, norms of engaging in 
principled decisionmaking.  
59 On these  see Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a 
Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16 (2002); JUDGES IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACY: AN 
INTERNATIONAL CONVERSATION (Robert Badinter and Stephen Breyer eds. 2004).  
60 These include the case or controversy limitations from language of Article III, and the provisions for life 
tenure and the kind of independence these contemplate.  
61 Other differences between representation in the U.S. Congress and elsewhere, and differences between 
serving in the House and the Senate, are discussed further below. 
62 See, e.g., HART & SACKS LEGAL PROCESS 696-705 (Eskridge and Frickey eds. 1994 of 1958 tentative 
edition) (Note on the Business of the Legislature) (describing legislature’s work in some detail as extending 
well beyond taking discrete votes on discrete pieces of legislation). 
63 See DAVID R. MAYHEW, AMERICA'S CONGRESS: ACTIONS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE-JAMES MADISON 
THROUGH NEWT GINGRICh (2000). 
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The activities of being a “representative” go well beyond votes in committee or 
on the floor. Representatives have opportunities to introduce proposed legislation, to 
participate in shaping laws through negotiation, to build and develop legislative agendas.  
They can hold hearings to highlight problems or build support for ideas.  They may 
develop capacities within the institution to provide expertise, or connections, to others, 
that can help an institution like a legislature function.  The desire to be re-elected is 
plainly a motivating factor, and a constraint – most of the time for most elected 
representatives -- but it is not an adequate account of the aspirations of being a 
representative.  A focus only on voting for legislation and the chances for re-election (and 
raising the money necessary to fund an election campaign) also may obscure the roles of 
representatives in the attitude formation process.64  
 
 Political science tends to be dominated by “positive” questions, asking about what 
representatives do and what motivates them.  The normative questions seem be addressed 
primarily in a political theory literature, some of which in recent years has focused on the 
nature of representation (in a specific way that goes beyond a  longstanding focus on the 
nature of democracy and its institutions).65  Could more use of this literature be made in 
law school classrooms? In the Issacharoff, Karlan and Pildes casebook on election law,66 
the debate over “trustee” vs. “delegate” views,67 e.g., of Burke, Aristotle and others on 
                                                
64 For discussion of the constructed elements of public opinion and group self-understandings, see, e.g.,  
Courtney Jung, Critical Liberalism, in POLITICAL REPRESENTATION (Shapiro, ed.), supra note _, at 139, 
149-51; Clarissa Riles Hayward, Making interest:  On representation and democratic legitimacy, in 
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION (Shapiro ed.) supra note __, at 111, 112 (arguing that representation should be 
understood to include responsibility in "shaping political interests in democracy promoting ways"). 
65 Some have suggested that the now classic work by HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF 
REPRESENTATION (1967), may have helped suppress other work until very recently.  For  more recent work 
of interest, see the exchanges between Jayne Mansbridge, Rethinking Representation, 97 APSR 515 (2003); 
Andrew Rehfeld, Representation Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates and Gyroscopes in the Study of 
Political Representation and Democracy, 103 APSR 214 (2009); and Jayne Mansbridge, Clarifying the 
Concept of Representation, 105 APSR 621 (2011). Also see SUZANNE DOVI, THE GOOD REPRESENTATIVE  
(2007); NADIA URBANATI, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (2006, 2008); Andrew Rehfeld, Towards a 
General Theory of Political Representation, 68 J Pol. 1 (2006); Michael Saward, The Representative 
Claim, 5 Cont. Pol. Theory 297 (2006); Michael Saward, Authorisation and Authenticity: Representation 
and the Unelected, 17 J Pol. Phil. 1 (2009). For useful summaries of developments see Nadia Urbinati and 
Mark Warren, The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory, 11 Annual Rev. Pol. 
Sci. 387 (2008); and Suzanne Dovi, Political Representation, entry in Stanford Encyclopedia Of 
Philosophy (2006, Updated 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/political-representation/    For a 
thoughtful account of why political theory has neglected a very important element of representation -- the 
duty at times to compromise - see Warren & Mansbridge, infra note __ (discussing how, inter alia, both 
Habermas and Sunstein treat legislative "bargaining" as something without positive normative value, as 
distinct from valuable forms of "deliberation"). 
66 SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY (4th ed 2012); but cf. DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN 
ET AL.,  ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 11-14 (5th ed. 2012) (excerpting Edmund Burke's speech) 
For casebooks on Legislation, see supra note __.  
67 See Jonathan Macey, Representative Democracy, 16 Harv. J. L. & Pol. 49, 49-50 (1993) (opposing 
"pluralist" vision of representing one's constituency with "guardian" vision of promoting the broader 
interest of all society).  A “trustee” or guardian may consider what his constituents think but regards 
himself as obligated to make an independent judgment in the context of multimember deliberations; a 
“delegate” views himself generally as more bound by the expressed views of his constituents. As Pitkin has 
suggested, a representative might think of herself in both ways – as having obligations to be responsive to 
constituents but also as having obligations to think and vote independently.  Indeed, Pitkin suggests, being 
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representation are briefly introduced – but generally with a focus on the goals of 
democracy itself, whether those goals are idealistic and public spirited, seeking a 
common good, or rather are more centered on regulating a power competition among 
economic (or other) groups; and with attention not so much to the normatively good 
legislator but to the normative justification for democracy itself.  Of course the two are 
closely linked: one cannot have a conception of a good legislator without a normative 
concept of why democracy and of what the legislature as a body should do.68 But there 
are benefits to be had from focusing some of our discussion on what the elected 
representatives themselves ought to be thinking about, if they are to regard themselves 
and be regarded by others as good representatives.  
 
 Although there are formal conceptions of being a representative that require 
nothing more than formal authorization,69 the job of “representatives” is not just to “vote” 
but to act as a representative.  Unlike judges, who in our society act only when called on 
by specific events initiated by other parties in a formalized process, it is a mistake to 
think of representatives as merely showing up and voting.  Representatives need to act – 
they need to legislate, to make provision for laws that will enable programs to be worked 
out, presumably for the welfare of their people.    
 
Cass Sunstein emphasized a related point about constitutions years ago – that they 
are designed not only to constrain but to empower and facilitate governance towards 
good public ends.70 Such “governance” is enabled or carried out, at least in important 
part, by elected representatives. And the carrying out that is implicit in the holding of a 
constitutional office is facilitated by a set of “pro-constitutional” representative functions 
and attitudes, that warrant the attention of constitutionalists.  
 
In 1787, after the U.S. Constitution was drafted, several noteworthy things 
happened.  Ratifying conventions were in fact organized and held. They debated and they 
reached conclusions by substantively voting on the measures.  Once the Constitution was 
                                                                                                                                            
a 'representative" requires some oscillation between these two modes - so as to render those represented 
"present" in some way, but recognizing that it is the representative, not the represented, who is actually 
"present " in a deliberative, collegial body, where information is exchanged and views may change through 
collegial discussion.  For these reasons, in part, Macey is incorrect to say that by rejecting "virtual" 
reprsentationas a theory, the Framers necessarily rejected a view that sometimes, representatives shoud act 
more independently of their constituencies, Macey, supra at 50  - a role concept reflected in the rejection of 
provisions for recall or instruction of members of the national Congress.  But cf Jonathan R Macey, The 
Missing Element in the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L J 1673, 1674 (1988) (framers' plan was to hope for 
republicanism but prepare for pluralism).  
68 On differences between the qualities of a legislature and the qualities of its members, see Vermeule, 
Forward: System Effects, supra note __, at ___, 40-42 (suggesting that for example, the biases of individual 
members of a collective body may cancel out, depending on their distribution) 
69 Pitkin offers four distinct views of representation – a formal view (mere fact of authorizing is what 
makes someone a representative); “symbolic” representation, in which a representative “stands for” the 
represented, as measured by how much the representative is accepted by her constituents; a  “descriptive” 
understanding, in which the question is how much does the representative resemble her constituents;  and a 
“substantive” view, that a representative should “act for” her constituents, that is, by advocating for their 
policy preferences.  This summary of Pitkin draws on Dovi’s entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. 
70 Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 633 (1991). 
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ratified, elections for national office were also actually held.  Once representatives were 
chosen, they actually trekked – no small thing – to New York to meet in Congress 
assembled.  And while there, they legislated into existence a national government.71   The 
point at which I am driving was that it took a willingness to commit, to act, on behalf of 
making the constitutional government come into being and work.   
 
The importance of pro-constitutional action is evident in several contexts. U.S. 
federal elections have always been held for national office on schedule, even during war.  
When opposition parties won, power has been handed over; and even when it was 
questionable, power has been handed over upon the decision of an apparently authorized 
institutional decisionmaker.72 For another example: The U.S. Census, which is in some 
ways a necessary part of the infrastructure for the democratic, constitutional legitimacy of 
the House of Representatives, has always been taken, every ten years, as called for in the 
Constitution.73  There are areas in which, in the past, and perhaps today, constitutional 
derelictions of duty in the political branches may have occurred. My point here is that it 
is possible to have a conversation about the obligations of elected representatives under 
the Constitution that has no connection to what courts will be able to decide. Indeed, it is 
one of my claims that an under-appreciated responsibility of elected representatives is to 
continue the never-ending task of participating in making a government that works.74    
 
Robin West has vigorously argued that law schools should refocus attention on 
legislators.75  I share some of her concern about the “unchecked valorization” of the 
judge as compared to the legislator. As she notes, casebooks and law school corridors are 
bedecked with pictures of Judges  -- “Holmes, Hand or Cardozo”, but not of great 
legislators – “Daniel Webster, Ted Kennedy” or, perhaps, Phil Hart.  As portrayed in law 
schools, she argues, judges debate, deliberate and reason, based on “encyclopedic 
knowledge” and with “eye on the future”; the legislator “reacts to constituent desire on 
the basis of his desire to stay in their good graces.” These ideas of the good judge and the 
bad legislator, she argues, are related to the idea that “law” – which comes from courts, is 
good --  and “politics,” which produces statutes, is bad.  Just as the realists and crits have 
                                                
71 On the activities of the First Congress, see, e.g.,  David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The 
First Congress and the Structure of Government, 1789-1791, 2 U. Chi. Law School Roundtable 161 
(1995).  I am not suggesting that these actions and the attitudes that underlay them sprang from nowhere; 
there was an experience of governing in both the separate states and through the government organized 
under the Articles. 
72 See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), and its aftermath. 
73 MARGO J. ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN CENSUS: A SOCIAL HISTORY 2 (1988).  This is not always true in 
democracies; compare Tennessee’s failure to reapportion itself between roughly 1900 and the time of 
Baker v Carr.  
74 On how the design of the constitution should be understood to promote not only checks on government 
but an effective and working government, see, e.g., David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of 
Powers, 124 Yale L. J. 2, 75-77 (2014). Cf. Jeremy Webber, Democratic DecisionMaking as the First 
principle of Contemporary constitutionalism, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH , supra note __ at 411, 411 
(2006) ("[C]onstitutions are not primarily about limiting government" but to "constitute government" by 
"specify[ing] the processes by which public decisions are made. … This is a positive role, a role that 
enables public action, not one that is adequately captured through the concept of limits.") 
75 See Robin West, Toward the Study of The Legislated Constitution, 72 Ohio St. L.J. 1343 (2011); ROBIN 
WEST, TEACHING LAW 111-14 (2014). 
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opened eyes that judging is not only about principle, but also about politics, so, she 
argues, we should look for the “legalist” impulse in politics.76 “We have not shifted our 
baseline assumption that politics is lacking in reason.”  We do not assume that legislators 
may have “genuine desire to serve the general welfare; that the legislator can be 
reasonable, and principled and judicious.”77  Although I would not go so far as to say that 
legislators can be as “principled” as judges – indeed, I do not think that is their job 
description -- , I agree with West that our approach in the law schools has failed to 
recognize the often “genuine desire to serve the general welfare” that motivates people to 
seek public office in the first place and that continues to animate at least some of what 
they do in public service.  She writes with particular force that because the center of what 
judges see as their calling is to treat like cases alike, the courts have construed the equal 
protection clause as a negative constraint requiring “rational sorting” by the legislators; in 
legislative hands, she argues, a “legislated constitution” of obligation to assure ‘equal 
protection” might, indeed should, look very different.  And, in ways consistent with the 
work on the constitution outside the courts of Mark Tushnet, Larry Kramer and others,78 
she urges that law schools begin to ask what a “legislated constitution” – that is, a 
constitution given meaning through legislative acts (statutes) and interpretations – would 
look like.  
 
 What I would like to add to this is the idea that legislators, like judges, have some 
core obligations at the heart of their calling as legislative representatives in a 
constitutional democracy. As noted earlier, these core obligations are in important 
respects quite different from the core obligations of judges; moreover, the obligations of 
representatives are in real tension with each other, embracing as they do both 
responsiveness to constituents and responsibility for the public welfare of the country as a 
whole, as well as responsibilities to comply with constitutional constraints and mandates.    
 
Part of the core “mandate” of being a representative in a constitutional democracy 
is, in some respects trans-substantive –it is to act on behalf of and as if they are a part of a 
working, ongoing government, that will continue to function beyond their term, on behalf 
of a society that likewise has existed in the past and will exist in the future.  In this 
respect, then, I want to draw some distinction between the idea that the Constitution 
contemplates affirmative (albeit nonjusticiable) obligations for those it calls 
“representatives” or “senators”, on the one hand, and the substantive content of those 
obligations.  That is, one could have a very different conception of what the affirmative 
measures the Constitution requires are than that for which Professor West argues, but still 
agree, in principle, that legislators have affirmative obligations under the Constitution 
and as elected representatives towards the future – the future of one’s constituency, of 
one’s institution, of one’s country, and, increasingly, the future of the increasingly inter-
connected world.  
                                                
76 For a thoughtful effort to reveal and understand the “legalism” in congressional lawmaking through the 
“rules” for legislation in the Congress, and their connection to understanding what a piece of legislation 
means, see Victoria Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 122 Yale L.J. 70-152 (2012).   
77 West, supra note __, at  1364.  
78 See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (2000); LARRY D. 




 So the idea of “pro-constitutional” behavior includes participating in making and 
keeping going a government that works under the Constitution.79  This is an obligation, 
whether one is in the majority or minority. It is part of what the Constitution 
contemplates is entailed in being a “representative” or “senator”, “elected by the people,” 
in the Congress of the United States.  Opposition is essential to democratic government; 
it is essential that opposition not be equated with “disloyalty.”80 But, the idea of pro-
constitutional behavior suggests that opposition by elected officials must be conducted in 
ways consistent with the obligation of all constitutional officers to participate in making 
constitutional government work, rather than to make constitutional government fail.81 
 
   
C. Defining Pro-Constitutional Attitudes and Responsibilities82 
 
The task of defining “pro-constitutional” behavior for elected representatives is  
more complex than the analogous task of defining pro-constitutional behavior by judges.  
                                                
79 Cf. STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 178-79  
(1997)((writing on the "poisitive constitutionalism" of John Stuart Mill and his conception of the "creative 
rather than merely protective functions" of liberal-democratic institutions; arguing that Locke envisioned 
representative government as a process of "public learning" and representative institutions as locations to 
advance "publicly useful knowledge").  
80 Waldron, The Principle of Loyal Opposition (May 2012). NYU School of Law, Public Law Research 
Paper No. 12-22. Available at: SSRN http://ssrn.com/abstract=2045647SSRN paper; David Fontana, 
Government in Opposition, 119 Yale 548 (2009).  For this reason, attitudes expressed in the apportionment 
process, on both sides of the political spectrum about "killing" the opposing party through gerrymandering 
are, if understandable, also concerning. See Rosen, supra note __ , at __ [quoting statements by legislators 
engaged in redistricting). 
81 Waldron evidently would not treat the idea of a loyal opposition as imposing any constraints on what the 
opposition does; indeed, he seems to reject all efforts to fill in the term “loyal to what,” and emphasizes 
rather the message to those with a majority of the loyalty of the opposition.  See id. at 31-41. Yet as he 
describes the idea of the loyal opposition in Britain, it is an opposition – fierce, and partisan to be sure – but 
one that is also “disciplined” by the responsibility to be ready to take over the government and run it. See 
id. at 11-14. Thus, Waldron notes that, apart from critiquing and holding accountable the existing 
government, the main role of the opposition is “to prepare for government,” and he suggests that “[t]he 
duty to provide a government in waiting influences how [the] duty of critique is performed.” Id. at 13. 
Having to have a consistent program, the paper suggests, imposes a certain responsibility. See id. at 14. 
Waldron quotes Jennings on how “irresponsible opposition” is not part of democratic government, and 
Burke on the benefits of a “regulated” rivalry, arguing that what regulates the competition is not loyalty as 
such but the prospects of actually having to govern. Id.   
82A caveat: Much of the recent political science literature focuses on forms of political representation that 
are not authorized through territorial constituencies' voting. I am focused here primarily on only one 
particular form of being a political representative: being an elected member from a single constituency in 
the U.S. separation of powers system.  There may be differences in the responsibilities and duties – or in 
the balance among the obligations – of representatives selected through party lists in a proportional 
representation system and representatives in single constituency winner take all elections.  There may also 
be differences in the balance of obligations for members of legislatures in a parliamentary system and those 
in a separation of powers system. (I will try to address these briefly in the final section.)  And there may be 
differences in the obligations of representatives who are not elected (e.g., heads of self-designated NGOs 
that are active in the legislative arena), or who are not selected in a constitutional democracy. These are for 




The ethics, virtues and desirable attitudes or habits of mind of an elected representative 
cannot be expected entirely to overlap with those of a judge; they are different roles, with 
different tasks. Some lines are drawn with relative clarity about the role of a judge -- to 
be principled, consistent, and impartial. For a representative, it seems much harder – what 
is the core? Ian Shapiro writes: “If representatives follow Burke’s ([1790], 1969) 
admonition not to sacrifice their judgment to the opinions of their constituents, they are 
vulnerable to charges of elitism, yet if their actions reflect the vicissitudes of public 
opinion, then they are ‘pandering.’ In short, representation is an elusive notion in 
democracies, a seemingly inevitable practice whose legitimacy is inescapably suspect.”83  
What – if any --  norms of impartiality towards all constituents, or the whole country,  do 
members have? Would we really want representatives who are as "principled" in their 
actins in public office as judges?  That the federal constitution subjects representatives, 
but not judges, to frequent elections,  suggest not.84 Do we rather want representatives 
who can work with, compromise with, other representatives to produce a product - 
legislation - that can function as law?85 Accountability, to be sure, is an important part of 
being a representative  -- but to whom or what? – the people who elected you?  your 
whole constituency? To the country as a whole? to your political party? to the legislature 
of which you serve as a part?  Or even, to a limited extent, to those beyond the country 
who are affected by your action/inaction? “Accountability” has something of an ‘after-
the-fact’ quality to it; is there more to being a good representative than being accountable 
to the right constituencies or stakeholders? 
 
 I am not sure there is one single normative conceptualization that will capture the 
range of ways of being a good representative and the range of considerations that inform 
judgments of the right course of action for a conscientious representative.86  There are to 
be sure the “shalt nots” – thou shalt not take bribes for legislative votes, nor engage in 
extortionate misuse of the office.   There are also the important constitutional “shalt nots” 
– thou shalt not pass a law abridging the freedom of speech, or establishing religion.  
Such constitutional commandments certainly embrace a role for representatives 
                                                
83 IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 58 (2003); see Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors 
of Bristol (Nov. 3, 1774), in [I THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE  446-48 (London: 
Henry G. Bohn, 1854--56)].  Shapiro praises Schumpeter’s insight that, in a representative democracy 
“power is acquired only through competition and held for a limited duration,” and grounded its effort to 
control power through the incentives of competition; where many offices are noncompetitive, however, the 
theory does not hold. SHAPIRO, supra, at __. This “competitive” model provides a conception of 
representation that will, at first thought, seem only rarely support a representative’s exercise of judgment 
that is independent from what the representative belies his or her constituents want or will accept; yet the 
recognition that a representative may try to lead public opinion gives considerable more substance to the 
possibility of an "independent" model of representation within a competitive system.   
84 As does the oft-made claim that legislation (and legislators) can draw arbitrary lines, forbidden to the 
courts to draw.  
85 See Russel Hardin, An Exact Epitome of the People, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH,  supra note __, at 
37 ("A legislature is a compromise.") 
86 Moreover, as suggested above, the balance of obligations (which obligations weigh more heavily) may 
be quite different depending on the particular kind of representative system one serves in --  for one elected 
as a representative from a single member district in a system like that in the U.S., than for one elected as a 
representative on a party “list” in a proportional representation system, as an example.   
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themselves to develop an understanding of what those constitutional prohibitions and 
limits are.  
 
 But what are the positive, “thou shalts”?  What does it mean to give a good 
account of oneself as a representative?87 And can we really evaluate the product of 
legislative bodies if we do not have some understanding of this question?  
 
 1. Acting as Part of Ongoing Government: As argued in Part B above, perhaps 
one could say, first, that an elected representative has some obligation to make the 
government in which she serves work for the people – that is, to govern, to act, rather 
than simply to obstruct.  I recognize that a representative may have a conception that 
“obstructing” “big government” projects, or some trends, is both the right thing to do and 
what she or he was elected to do.  But even so, standing for Congress and being elected 
surely can be understood to carry with it an obligation to participate, affirmatively, in 
governance, even if only for those most basic functions of a state and those by 
implication required by the Constitution (e.g., to guarantee a republican form of 
government).88 
 
2. Being Sufficiently "Present" to "Represent": Second, we might say that 
representatives have some obligation to be sufficiently active and present in the 
legislature so as to achieve some minimum level of in fact “representing” – making her 
constituency, its mix of views, values, interests, conflicts – “present” in the larger body 
so that the larger body’s work has democrat legitimacy vis-a-vis the constituency.89  In 
both of these capacities, a representative may have obligations to advocate for goals or 
positions,90 as well as to check and question initiatives of the executive branch, to 
monitor and provide oversight of existing programs and to consider the need for 
legislative change.  Some of these obligations might be captured under the idea of 
"responsiveness" to constituents. Such responsiveness might be seen as having dual 
components: developing and advancing policy preferences of constituents while checking 
developments ones' constituents oppose, and, in the U.S. system, providing constituent 
service on individual matters, as discussed further below in point 3.91  
 
                                                
87 For one kind of answer, see DOVI, THE GOOD REPRESENTATIVE, supra note __, at 88-91 discussing the 
idea of “democratic advocacy” as an obligation of the good representative; and discussing the “virtues” of 
fair-mindedness, which I pick up on below; “critical trust building”; and ”good gatekeeping”.  Her account 
has influenced some of what follows.  
88 Cf. Pildes, Political Avoidance, Constitutional Theory and the VRA, Yale L J Pocket Part 2007, on 
"avoidance" and abdication of responsibility by elected representatives. 
89 See PITKIN, supra note __ (on “making present” those represented).  
90 In addition to DOVI, supra note __, see NADIA URBINATI, REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 44-48 (2006) 
(linking advocacy roles of representatives to the possibility of legislation reflecting judgments about what 
is just). 
91 For an older study suggesting that responsiveness to individual constituent problems has increased, while 
collective "responsiveness" to public views has declined, see Stephen Ansolabehere, David Brady and 
Morris Fiorina, The Vanishing Marginals and Electoral Responsiveness, 22 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 21, 27-29 




3. Being "Responsive" and "Accountable": Two-Way Exchanges of 
Information: Third, some core responsibilities of listening to, advocating for, and 
providing information to voters may derive from being a democratically elected 
representative, who can remain in office only by winning a (presumptively, if not 
actually) competitive election.92 As noted, part of the core of being a representative is to 
be “accountable” to one’s constituency (which is not necessarily the same as being 
“responsive;” there is l debate over the balance between the “responsivenesss” and the 
“independence” that it is normatively desirable and politically possible for elected 
representatives to enjoy).  
 
Does this obligation of accountability imply obligations to listen, to respond and 
to provide information? Does it entail obligations of advocacy  -advocating for the 
interests of ine's constieunts; advocating to one's constituents what the representative 
believes the bets answer is?  On most theories of the role of a representative in a 
democracy, there must be some form of accountability to voters, of behaving so that the 
voters in your constituency can evaluate your work – whether representation is seen as a  
“promissory” grant of authority, in which the voters look back to see if the representative 
fulfilled promises, or a more “anticipatory” model, in which representatives try to 
anticipate voters’ views at the time of the next election, or instead a more “gyroscopic” 
form of representation by one elected because the constituency trusts the representative to 
make independent decisions but retains power to fail to reelect the representative if her 
account of her actions as a representative is not satisfying.93  Some argue that the 
“accountability” function is best satisfied by direct communications by the representative, 
e.g., over the internet, or social media, explaining each of his/her votes or other actions to 
the voters.94  But few would argue – on any theory of being a democratic representative – 
that there is no need for any flow of opinion and information to and from voters about the 
representative’s performance.95 
 
Information flow -- about the issues confronting our government and about the 
position of different parties or candidates on those issues -- is in theory essential.  
                                                
92 On the importance of actual competition to democratic legitimacy, see Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and 
Political Cartels, supra note __.  
93 These terms are drawn primarily from Mansbridge (2003). Per Mansbridge: “Promissory” theories view 
the representative as having an obligation to keep promises made in the past to constituents; if the 
representative fails to do so, the sanction is not being reelected. “Anticipatory” approaches envision the 
representative as having an obligation to anticipate what his constituents will approve of at the next 
election.  Each of these could be understood as a form of a “mandate” or “delegate” model of 
representation. “Gyroscopic” representatives, a theory Mansbridge has developed, reach decisions without 
much conscious regard for their representatives’ views; if the voters select a representative who mirrors 
them, a gyroscopic representative will reflect their views while exercising independent judgment.  
Gyroscopic models combined with a focus on voters’ powers of selection may be seen to produce a non-
elitist version of Burke’s “trustee” model.  
94 Steven Jackson, Ethics of Representation (unpublished mss. Fall 2012) (discussing “conversational” 
model of representation).  
95 See URBINATI, supra note __, at 49-52,  (developing idea of "representativity" and of "reflexive 
adhesion," and linking them to Benjamin Constant's idea that political representation has two levels -- 
representation of the people's will as expressed in elections and representation of changes in public opinion 
between elections).   
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Whether one conceives of electing representatives as subject to voter mandates or voter 
accountability,96 or of representative government as serving the public good through 
interest group pluralism or through more deliberative conceptions of democracy,97 
information flow permitting evaluation of competing options is critical.98  
  
4. Providing Assistance Fairly and Impartially to Constituents: Fourth, do 
members of Congress, as representatives, have obligations to provide their constituents 
with assistance in dealing with other parts of the government, such as executive branch 
agencies?  Should these obligations be conceived as arising out of the representative-
constituent relationship, or also (or rather) as reflecting a "checking" function of 
legislators on whether executive departments are properly carrying out the laws?99   
 
More contestably, do representatives have obligations of fairness in dealing with 
their constituents,100 even those with whom they disagree?101 Justices of the Supreme 
Court have said that "[a]n individual or a group of individuals who votes for a losing 
                                                
96 See, e.g., Bernard Manin, et al., Elections and Representation, in PRZEWORKSI, ET AL, DEMOCRACY, 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND REPRESENTATION, supra, at 29-51; [other cites?] 
97 Compare, e.g., ROBERT DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (195) (illuminating interest-group 
pluralist accounts of democracy under which representative democracy works through coalitions based on 
the interests of different groups) and DAVID B, TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951) with AMY 
GUTMANN AND DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond 
the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L.J. 1539 (1987) (emphasizing civic virtue in participatory self-
government); Michael Sandel, The Constitution of the Procedural Republic: Liberal Rights and Civic 
Virtues, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 2 (1997) (defending civic republicanism) ; and the essays in [Mansbridge, J. 
(ed.), 1990, Beyond Self-Interest, ]. Cf. JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 
[ch. XX1] (1956) (envisioning the best form of democracy as one characterized by voting for competing 
elite leadership rather than broader forms of participation). Neo-liberal accounts may be treated as theories 
of democracy but they can perhaps be better viewed as theories of liberal protection of economic values 
based on the market. 
98 BERNARD MANIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 197 (1997) (emphasizing 
importance of "trial by discussion" where one party tries to change opinions of another based on impersonal 
or long term factors); SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note __, at __ ( noting need for 
deliberation both with those who are like-minded, at times, and with those who are not, at other times); cf. 
Schacter, Political Accountability, supra note __at 52-53 (noting but critiquing literature arguing that that 
even if few voters were well informed, those well-informed voters can play important role in 
accountability). Manin notes the significance of shared understandings of facts, made possible by "neutral" 
channels of communication; he contrasts French public opinion at the time of the Dreyfus affair which, he 
argues, was divided as to the facts because political parties controlled the media which people read, and 
Watergate, when there was a shared sense of the facts among people of different parties because, he says, 
the principal media of communication were not controlled by parties.  If today more people receive their 
information from likeminded channels of communication affiliated with political parties, this poses more of 
a challenge to the kind of exchange both interest-based and deliberative/civic virtue based theories depend. 
99 Cf. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 702 (1994) (describing members of 
legislature as having the "job of serving as intermediary between constituents and the numerous branches 
of the executive department with which they have to deal " and suggesting that  "[i]n an important sense, 
the Congressman carries the responsibility here to see that the executive action is lawful”).   
100 On the advantage of single member districts in strengthening the relationship of representative to 
constituents, see Samuel Issacharoff, Supreme Court Destabilization of Single-Member Districts, 1995 U. 
Chi. Legal F. 205 229-31. 
101 Cf. Warren & Mansbridge, infra note__ (defining as an element of just public deliberation fairness in 
terms of including all affected interest sin the discussion). 
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candidate is usually deemed to be adequately represented by the winning candidate and to 
have as much opportunity to influence that candidate as other voters in the district."102 If 
so, would representatives have obligations of fair dealing with all their constituents?103 
This may arise when constituents come to their district or state representatives with 
requests for assistance. But it may also arise in thinking about representatives’ duties to 
communicate, noted above and elaborated below.  
 
Are there obligations of fairness in providing information to their constituents 
about policy issues in an effort to influence their judgments? in seeking to win election or 
reelection?  It surely is the case that democracy can benefit from passionate, one-sided 
presentations on various sides of issues; a free press, and freedoms of speech can help to 
secure this possibility. Are representatives in some sense more like legal advocates, 
legitimately arguing for one position? Do they have obligations of accuracy in so doing? 
Or do representatives have special obligations of fairness in the discussion and 
presentation of information relevant to the public? Do they have an obligation to avoid 
providing information so one-sided as to be “propaganda”? Or is such one-sidedeness a 
normatively neutral or good activity given the welter of other sources and potential 
rivals? 
 
5. Opinion Leadership: Fifth, do representatives sometimes have obligations of 
opinion leadership?104  One-way models of transmission of constituents’ preferences do 
not seem accurately to capture what many representatives do.  On at least some issues 
some representatives might see themselves not merely as a faithful reporter or recorder or 
transmitter of constituents’ views but as being in a conversation with constituents, in 
which appropriate and better views are worked out, the representative’s views being 
informed not only by her constituents but by what she/he learns from other 
representatives in the Congress. Are there obligations of representatives to exercise 
leadership when, for example, her constituency’s understanding of its own interest is 
framed in too short term a time frame?  Do representatives have responsibilities 
affirmatively to speak out and provide information, to assist in legitimate opinion 
formation towards the goal of constitutional, effective and workable government?     
 
6. Compromise: Sixth, do representatives ever have an obligation to 
compromise?105  This may be an especially difficult question for constitutional law 
                                                
102 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) (White, J., joined by Brennan, marshall and Blakcmun).  
In the next sentence,  Justice White seems to equate "adequacy" of representing the losers' interests with 
anything short of "entirely ignoring" them: "We cannot presume in such a situation, without actual proof to 
the contrary, that the candidate elected will entirely ignore the interests of those voters." Id.  
103 Cf. NADIA URBINATI, REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 58 (2006) (representatives should have a "double 
identity," one partisan, one general); id. at 42-43 (representation requires "proportionality" in representation 
in the sense of views being heard and considered). 
104 Cf. Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, supra note __,  at 622 (arguing that important 
measures of political legitimacy from competitive elections "are forced to attempt to educate and influence 
the voting public, and are in a deep sense accountable to changes in the preferences of the electorate"). 
105 More generally, see AMY GUTMANN AND DENNIS THOMPSON, THE SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE (2012). For 
discussion of compromise in U.S. constitution-making and constitutional law, see, e.g., Sanford Levinson, 
Compromise and Constitutionalism, 38 Pepp. L. Rev. 5 (2011) (applying distinction between “bad” and 
“rotten” compromises); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Variable Morality of Constitutional (and Other) 
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professors to consider in a discussion of what being a normatively good constitutional 
legislator entails; the influence of judicial modes of decisionmaking according to 
principles of consistency may lead us to believe that compromise is always or usually a 
bad thing; whether judges on multi-member courts should compromise to produce a 
unified opinion or write separately continues to provoke disagreement and discussion.  
But for a multi-member, heterogenous democratic legislative assembly, the “spirit of 
compromise” is an essential attribute to get done the public’s work of governing; or, it is 
essential unless a single mindset has a very dominant majority in the legislature, a 
situation that brings with it other problems in a democracy.  
 
As Warren & Mansbridge put it, "the capacity to act is an integral part of the 
meaning of democracy;"106 legislatures that lack the capacity to negotiate and 
compromise cannot fulfill basic functions of legislatures in a democracy.107 This may not 
mean that every legislator must have the spirit of compromise; but enough members must 
in order to enable the legislature to work.108  Legislators that lack the ability to engage in 
good negotiation processes will fail to reach compromises that would have substantial 
public support and advance the common good; thus, in Warren & Mansbridge's terms, 
such gridlock reduces the normative legitimacy of the legislatures.  Moreover, as an 
empirical matter, legislatures that gridlock tend to lead to power migration to other 
institutions and to loss of public confidence in the legislature.109 
                                                                                                                                            
Compromises: A Comment on Sanford Levinson's Compromise and Constitutionalism, 38 Pepp. L. Rev. 
903 (201x) (arguing that “compromise is sometimes a moral good in itself”); Vicki C. Jackson, Principle 
And Compromise In Constitutional Adjudication: The Eleventh Amendment And State Sovereign Immunity, 
75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 953 (2000) (arguing that some constitutional provisions represent “compromises,” 
and some represent “principles” and should be interpreted accordingly); John Manning, Separation of 
Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1940 (2011) (arguing that because the constitution is 
a "bundle of compromises," separation of powers issues should be decided by ordinary interpretation in 
light  of Congress' broad powers under the necessary and proper clause), and the role of compromise; cf. 
ROBERT MNOOKIN, BARGAINING WITH THE DEVIL: WHEN TO NEGOTIATE, WHEN TO FIGHT (2010) 
(rejecting “categorical answers” to the question posed by the book’s title).] 
 
106 Mark Warren & Jayne Mansbridge, with André Bächtiger, Maxwell A. Cameron, Simone Chambers, 
John Ferejohn, Alan Jacobs, Jack Knight, Daniel Naurin, Melissa Schwartzberg, Yael Tamir, Dennis 
Thompson, and Melissa Williams, Deliberative Negotiation (paper presented February 2104, Harvard Law 
School). 
107 See Richard Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy,  Political Fragmentation, 124 Yale L J 804, 845 (2014) 
("[E]ffective governance inevitably requires negotiation, particularly in our separated-powers system.") 
108 Query if there is an obligation to respect co-legislators, as having been elected by other people in the 
overall nation, which is a grounding for felt obligations to compromise? On the "decline of compromise" in 
the Congress, see Carl Hulse and Jeremy W. Peters, "Struggle over Government Funding Points to the 
Decline of Compromise," N.Y. Times (Dec. 12, 2014) ("The near collapse of a critical government-wide 
funding bill that now faces a Senate test underscored a fundamental problem with Congress -- the lost art of 
compromise." "Seasoned lawmakers and congressional aides watched in amazement the near failure of a 
measure that was endorsed by the majority leadership of both the House and the Senate and President 
Obama and contained dozens of provisions sought by both parties.  They acknowledge that the deep 
partisanship and procedural disorder of recent years have taken a significant toll on the ability of the House 
and Senate to get things done.").  See also supra note __ (noting article concerning Boehner's declaration of 
"no compromise"] 
109 See Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, supra note __ , at __; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U.S. 579, 655 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[No] decision by this Court can keep power in the 




7. Acting on Matters that Other Jurisdictions Cannot Handle Effectively:  
Seventh, focusing on federal representatives: do the constitutional grants of power over, 
e.g., federal taxes and budgets, over interstate commerce, bankruptcy, copyright and 
patents, or (even) elections contemplate a duty to act, a level of responsibility and 
attention, such that if things are going wrong, those with power to act have some 
responsibility to consider acting to fulfill the goals of the Constitution and of the grants of 
power?  (Recall that I am not talking about justiciable obligations, but rather, an enriched 
understanding of the constitutional role of legislators.)  Congress has power to regulate 
the “manner” of congressional elections; do recent events suggest that representatives 
have a duty at least to consider further exercising this power (e.g., by standardizing 
voting machines, or limiting barriers to voting in federal elections)?  
     
     *** 
 
 Accountability to multiple and potentially conflicting stakeholders: Why is it so 
much harder to develop useful normative frameworks for being a “good” elected 
representatives than for being a “good” judge? In the case of elected representatives, just 
thinking about the range of stakeholders to whom one might have obligations of 
accountability is enough to make the head spin.110 There are, of course, the voters who 
elected you, and the voters who voted against you in your constituency, and nonvoters in 
your constituency (whose well-being may influence voters), as well as those in your 
constituency who you hope will vote for you in the future.111 There are voters in the 
broader polity of which all are a part, and those who are not voters at all but are affected 
by what one does. One might also feel obligations to fellow representatives, or 
congressional leadership, to say nothing about one’s party,112 or one’s institution as such 
(the House, the Senate, the Congress).   
 
Maybe one of the reasons for the relative flatness of this literature in law is that it 
is a much harder project to engage in than the normative discourses around good judging; 
putting to one side the situation of elected judges, judicial accountability, however hard 
to define, seems to involve a smaller range of stakeholders with more indirect interests.   
But a better understanding of what, aspirationally, representatives should do – with no 
doubt a range of normatively complicated views --  will better enable evaluation of what 
                                                                                                                                            
prevent power from slipping through its fingers."); Teter, supra note __ at 1152-55 (arguing that gridlock 
over the debt ceiling in 2011 had tendency to push the President to take one of several actions, any of 
which would have involved assertion of an unprecedented executive power). 
110 Cf. OTTO J. HETZEL, MICHAEL E. LIBONATI, ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 81-88 (2008) (drawing from DAVID J. VOGLER, THE POLITICS OF CONGRESS (1988) to 
distinguish between the representative's "style of representation" - as "trustee" or as "delegate", and the 
representative's "focus of representation" - - " whether legislators think primarily in terms of the whole 
nation, in terms of their constituencies, or some combination of these”).  
111 Cf. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION  53 (2007) (suggesting that legislators concerned about reelection " will consider potential 
preferences of the inattentive public and the likelihood that voters will focus on these preferences at 
election time"). 
112 See Richard Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, etc., Yale L J  (2014) 
(suggesting that problems of governance might be mitigated by stronger political parties) 
29 
 
they do do – individually, and acting together to legislate. 113 Discussing these issues in 
the context of the multiple normative demands on an elected representative, taking 
account of the normative values behind the fact of election and standing for reelection, 
reveals, I think, how complex and challenging it can be to act as a good representative 
(and perhaps especially in a non-parliamentary system like that in the US).  
 
 D. Examples Illustrating Application of Criteria for Pro-Constitutional Behavior 
 
 Some examples will illustrate the complexity of applying these criteria to evaluate 
particular actions; yet, I hope, the discussion will also suggest the benefits of trying to 
define with more acuity the range of normative considerations  -- including but not 
limited to the desire to be reelected – that representatives should consider. 
 
Consider some recent episodes of constitutional conflict between Congress and 
the President.  The first involves the refusal to confirm nominees for authorized agencies, 
for example, Richard Cordray for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.114 The 
refusal, let us assume, is not based on objections to Cordray’s qualifications, but rather, 
objections of some members of the Senate to the design of the statute enacted by a prior 
Congress.115   
 
To begin with, it is clear that senators have constitutional authority to refuse to 
confirm.  There is no justiciable obligation even to vote on proposed nominees. And it 
might be argued that, given the power, Senators can legitimately use it to try to elicit 
concessions from other actors to amend the underlying statute. 
 
 Yet it might be argued that there is (or there was and should now be) a 
constitutional convention that generally favors an up or down vote on presidential 
                                                
113 An important question is the difference between discussing obligations of legislators as individuals and 
obligations of a representative body as a whole. See Vermeule, Foreword, supra note __. Waldron suggests 
that an advantage or virtue of representative lawmaking (over direct democracy) is that representatives can 
engage in what Waldron calls "abstraction" -- of distancing themselves enough from particular concrete 
situations to be able to frame laws at the right levels of generality. Jeremy Waldron, Representative 
Lawmaking, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 335, 349 (2009) ("representatives should present people's interests, concerns 
and ideals, universalizably, under certain aspects"). Describing Urbinati's work, Waldron says, she argues 
that " representation “helps to depersonalize claims and opinions” in a way that makes deliberation easier." 
Id. at 350.  Can one deduce obligations for individual legislators from this aspect of representative 
lawmaking? Or is the ability to "abstract" one that only be evaluated across the entire legislature?  
114 For useful accounts of this episode, see, e.g., Michael J. Teter, Congressional Gridlock's Threat to 
Separation of Powers, 2013, Wis. L. Rev.1097, 1150-51 (2013);  [[Jeff VanDam, The Kill Switch: The 
New Battle over Presidential Appointments, 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. 361 (2012); John C. Roberts, The Struggle 
over Executive Appointments, 2014 Utah L. Rev. 725 (2014); Alexander M. Wolf, Taking Back Whats' 
Theirs: The Recess Appointments Clause, Pro-forma Sessions, and a Political Tug of War, 81 Fordham L 
Rev 2055 (2013);] see also Developments in the Law--Presidential Authority, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 2057, 
2135--xxxx; 
115 See John H. Cushman, Jr., Senate Stops Consumer Nominee, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8 2011 (quoting Senator 
Hatch, a Republican, saying "This is not about the nominee, who appears to be a decent person, and may 
very well be qualified.") 
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nominees.116 (That is, to the extent that there was a positive practice of up or down votes, 
that practice may have normative, not merely positive, weight, for legislative 
interpretation of how to implement constitutional powers.)  It might be thought that 
voting - - affirmatively manifesting whether or not the Senate consents – is a part of the 
active responsibility of members of the Senate, to make a government that works.   But is 
there a further obligation to vote in favor of the President’s nominee, if members have no 
objections to the character, temperament or competence of the nominee for the position? 
 
If the only responsibility of an elected representative were to act so as to facilitate 
government, the answer would arguably be yes.  Government cannot function well, and 
the rule of law aspects of government are confounded, if the legislature creates bodies 
which then cannot act because they do not have appropriate heads or staffing. Likewise, 
from the point of view of a sense of accountability to the institution of Congress itself: If 
a prior Congress has enacted a statutory scheme, even if one disagrees with it, it might be 
argued that both the responsibility to promote a working government and a sense of 
responsible continuity with past Congresses would favor a yes vote, on behalf of a well 
qualified nominee, even if the nominee is to head an agency of which the representative 
disapproves.117 
 
But we must complicate things further. Imagine the representative not only 
believes the agency is a bad idea (either because of views on the specific issue or because 
government has generally grown too large), but also believes (correctly let’s assume) that 
the majority of her or his home-state constituents also believe the agency is a bad idea.   
The Senator cares about their views not only because he is their representative but 
because he hopes, in the next election, to be returned to office.  This electoral connection 
is one that, by constitutional design, can be understood to tell elected representatives that 
they should place considerable weight, much of the time, on what their constituents 
would favor.   
 
It does not, of course, address whether the representative should simply accept 
their views as a given or seek to influence or change them.  What if the Senator believes 
the agency is a bad idea, but also believes it is a bad idea to legislate and not fill 
positions; that it would be better to try to repeal the legislation than to obstruct its 
fulfillment while it remains law on the books? What if the Senator, considering his or her 
obligations to all of the people in her home state, or to the people as a whole, recognizes 
the normative force of a prior decision to establish this agency as that which is desired by 
a majority?  Should the Senator consider activating an opinion-influencing role, to try to 
persuade his or her constituents of the need to accommodate both the act of a prior 
                                                
116 See David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 Yale L. J. 2, 76 (2014) (describing 
earlier convention that all nominees recommended out of Committee received a floor vote). Although 
unwritten conventions, not enforceable by courts,  are more widely associated with British 
constitutionalism, a number of writers have argued that they can be identified and contribute importantly to 
constitutional government in the United States, See, e.g., id at  at 38-39 
117 Cf. Andre Marmor, Should We Value Legislative Integrity, in LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH 125, 137-38 




majority to legislate the agency (by allowing it to be headed and to function as intended) 
while working to repeal or modify the legislation?  
 
These questions largely concern the multiple constituencies that one could 
imagine accountability towards, and the possible existence of duties affirmatively to act 
as a representative  (including, in the different case of so-called secret “holds,” the duty 
to provide information to constituents). They do not answer the question of what the 
legislator should do, but they sketch some of the normative questions a good legislator 
might consider in arriving at an answer.   
 
Imagine again that you are a Senator opposed to the current statute for the agency, 
and believe your constituents are likewise opposed, and you believe, for good reason. On 
the question of whether there is an obligation to compromise, is it a legitimate form of 
activity to threaten to withhold confirmation of worthy heads of federal agencies unless 
changes in the statute are made?  They are not unrelated activities.  And while the norm 
of enabling government to work favors having an agency have a head, the norm of 
compromise and the obligations owed to one's constituents may provide legitimate 
support to the refusal to confirm in order to elicit compromise from others on the future 
of the agency. 
 
More blanket refusals to confirm, or, arguably, patterns of using confirmation as  
a bargaining chip on behalf of a minority view against decisions taken by a legitimate 
prior majority, raise, I think, somewhat distinct questions.  At some point acts that, taken 
alone seem well within the range of legitimate reconciliation of the various forms of 
duties and responsibilities of representatives may become the kinds of obstruction, or 
denials of the legitimacy of the general norm of lawmaking and law execution by elected 
majorities and by the President, to run afoul of the first duty discussed – the duty to act so 
as to enable government to proceed.  Moreover, at some point, repeated efforts or 
patterns have the potential to become a way of delegitimating the results of elections 
themselves – with consequences too vividly illustrated in too many other countries to 
require detailing.118  That the question is a matter of degree does not remove it from the 
realm of constitutional judgment.119 
 
 Let’s turn to another example, drawn from the debt ceiling crisis of the summer of 
2011.120  As described in footnote below, Congress threatened not to raise the debt ceiling 
in the summer of 2011 in order to allow Treasury borrowing to fund decisions already 
                                                
118 That multiple uses of formal legal powers can move systems in anti-constitutionalist directions has been 
noted in a different context,  in which formally legal procedures are used to move systems away from 
democracy and towards more authoritarian status. See David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. 
Davis L Rev 189 (2013). 
119 Cf., e.g., Pozen, Self-Help, supra note __ at ___ (arguing for norm of proportionality in evaluating the 
appropriateness of measures of constitutional self-help); Developments--Presidential Authority, supra note 
__ at [2061] (" Sometimes, the line dividing legitimate use of presidential authority from abuse of power is 
only a matter of degree."). 
120 See Richard Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the Decline of American 
Government, 124 Yale L.J. 804, 808 (2014) (treating near default as example of decline of government in 
the United States) 
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made by Congress in authorizing federal spending and making appropriations, and 
despite predictions of adverse effects for the U.S. bond market.121  The apparent aim of 
the threat, largely made by Tea Party Republicans, was to require spending cuts that 
equaled increases in the debt ceiling.  The President and most Democrats opposed this 
proposal, believing that if the budget deficit were to be trimmed, both taxes and spending 
should be considered.  
 
 Interestingly, the most lively debate among legal scholars that this crisis generated 
initially seemed to focus on what the President should do, rather than on what members 
of Congress should do.122  But if, as some scholars argued, the President was faced only 
with unconstitutional alternatives, would this not imply that Congress – the lawmaking 
body that had the authority to raise the debt ceiling, or modify the budget – had some 
duty itself to take action that would respond to these potentially unconstitutional 
situations? And if different members of Congress had different views on constitutionality, 
would the obligation to compromise not come importantly into play?  
                                                
121 As Dorf and Buchanan describe it:: “In the spring of 2011, federal officials observed that at some point 
later in the year, the federal government would be unable to meet all of its obligations unless the federal 
debt ceiling were raised. That was not an economic problem. Interest rates on United States Treasury Bills 
were close to zero percent, and the government could readily issue new debt to cover its expenses, if only 
Congress would go through the formal process of raising the debt ceiling to conform with the budget that it 
itself had then only recently approved. There was a political problem, however. Expressing concern about 
long-term fiscal deficits, Republicans in Congress—especially those allied with the Tea Party movement—
insisted on a dollar of current spending cuts for every dollar increase in the debt ceiling. Even as Keynesian 
economists warned of the dangers of premature austerity, Democrats, including President Barack Obama, 
accepted the Republican view that deficit reduction was imperative, but they insisted that increased tax 
revenues had to be part of the formula for achieving that goal. A standoff ensued. . . . [A]t the eleventh hour 
Congress did indeed pass legislation raising the debt ceiling and punting to a newly created bi-partisan 
congressional “supercommittee”  the question of how to achieve the deficit reduction that was also 
mandated by the legislation. With the super-committee now having failed to send a legislative proposal to 
Congress for consideration, automatic spending cuts will occur, unless Congress enacts superseding 
legislation.”  Neil H. Buchanan and Michael C. Dorf,   How to Choose the Least Unconstitutional Option: 
Lessons for the President )and others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1175, 1177 
(2012).  On July 14, 2011, Standard and Poor’s warned that it might and, in August 2011, it did act to 
downgrade quality of U.S. Treasury bonds, largely because of apparent lack of political will to manage the 
budget in a  responsible way (and even though the immediate debt ceiling crisis had been resolved).  See 
Zachary A . Goldfarb, S&P Downgrades U.S. Credit  Rating for the First Time, Washington Post, Aug. 6, 
2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/sandp-considering-first-downgrade-of-us-credit-
rating/2011/08/05/gIQAqKeIxI_story.html. 
122 See, e.g., Neil H. Buchanan and Michael C. Dorf, How to Choose the Least Unconstitutional Option: 
Lessons for the President (and Others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff, 112 Columbia Law Review 1176 
(2012); on the blogs, see  Ronald Dworkin, Can Obama Extend the Debt Ceiling on His Own?, N.Y. Rev. 
Books (July 29, 2011, 11:58 am), http:// www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2011/jul/29/can-obama-extend-
debt-ceiling-his-own/ (arguing that the President has authority to ignore the debt ceiling basdd on the 
fourteenth Amendment “validity of the public debt” clause); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Op-Ed., 
Obama Should Raise the Debt Ceiling on His Own, N.Y. Times (July 22, 2011), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2011/07/22/opinion/22posner.html?r=0 (arguing for presidential authority to act for “the 
necessities of state”); Larry Tribe, A Ceiling We Can’t Wish Away, N. Y. Times, July 7, 2011 at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/08/opinion/08tribe.html?_r=0.  To be sure, a later article by Buchanan 
and Dorf was addressed to both the President and the Congress, see Neil Buchanan and Michael Dorf, 
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Debt Ceiling: When Negotiating over Spending and Tax Laws, Congress 
and the President Should Consider the Debt Ceiling a Dead Letter, Columbia Law Review, 113 Colum L. 




 In addition to factors discussed in connection with the first example (withholding 
confirmation), there are other potentially relevant factors here. First, the issues raised by 
the 2011 debt crisis had clearer implications for foreign affairs; damage done might thus 
be less within the control of domestic institutions to repair.  Second, much graver harm to 
the domestic economy was potentially at stake. Third, the situation arguably posed a 
more serious rule of law problem, as evidenced by the development of constitutional 
theories and proposals that substantially ‘pushed the envelope’ of accepted 
understandings.   These three factors – together with the availability of other means in the 
near future to take steps to redress budget deficits – for those who believed they were 
harmful to the economy -- made the costs of playing “chicken” much higher in this case 
than in the first, and, arguably, increased the importance of compromise to avoid such 
harms. 
 
 Still another example of a failure of pro-constitutional representation, which arose 
after this paper was first presented, was the sixteen-day government shutdown in October 
2013. Described in scholarship as a "distinctively American version of political 
failure,"123  this sixteen day period saw the suspension of all "nonessential services" - -
including environmental monitoring, work on a backlog of veterans disability claims, and 
the closure of services for over 6,000 preschool children.124  The shutdown resulted from 
efforts by the Republican majority in the House of Representatives to prevent 
implementation of the Affordable Care Act of 2010, by "condition[ing] support for 
continuing resolutions [to fund the government] on the delaying or defunding the 
Affordable Care Act."125  The costs of the shutdown to the government (and taxpayers) 
were estimated at between two and six billion dollars.126  As Professor Young observes, 
the Republican Party is "more tolerant of shutdowns," and thus has a "bargaining 
advantage."127  But shutting down the government is the antithesis of what any elected 
representative - whether in favor of smaller government or larger government - should 
want; such shutdowns sweep indiscriminately, and result in the disruption of programs 
that had been authorized by law.  Use of budget shutdowns to bargain for changes in 
recently enacted legislation has a high risk of inviting retaliatory responses; their 
increasing and increasingly routine use is hard to reconcile with a basic commitment to 
the public good and a working government.128  
 
Examples of concern arise not only at the national level but in state legislatures as 
well. Consider the decision of the Democratic members of the Wisconsin State Senate to 
literally leave the State of Wisconsin in  early 2011, to prevent a quorum from existing in 
                                                
123 Katherine G. Young, American Exceptionalism and Government Shutdowns: A Comparative 
Constitutional Reflection on the 2014 Lapse in Appropriations, 94 B. U. L. Rev. 991, 991 ((2014). 
124 Id. at 993-94. 
125 Id. at 996.  
126 Id. at 997. 
127 Id. at 1001. 
128 On the relationship between the debt ceiling crisis and the later government shutdown, see Neil 
Buchanan and Michael Dorf, Bargaining In The Shadow Of The Debt Ceiling: When Negotiating Over 
Spending And Tax Laws, Congress And The President Should Consider The Debt Ceiling A Dead Letter, 
113 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar  32 (2013). 
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the Senate so as to try to prevent the Republican governor and legislative majority party 
from enacting a budget and anti-union measures with which they disagreed.129 The 
legality of their move is debatable.130 Even if lawful, a decision by elected legislators to 
absent themselves, if exercised frequently, could undermine the possibility of democratic 
self-government altogether.131 
 
Finally, consider legislative spending projects that are often referred to 
disparagingly as "pork", as in "pork barrel politics." An example might be the funding for 
the so-called “bridge to nowhere” promoted by public officials from Alaska.132  Although 
such projects are often criticized as wasteful, and not in the public interest, it is hard to 
imagine that an elected representative would seek such funding if it were not in the 
interests of some of the representative's constituents. Those "public interests" of 
particular constituencies might well be served by the spending; when "pork barrel" 
accusations are made, it is often the case that there is some public-spirited reason for the 
spending from the viewpoint of particular constituents.133 "Pork barrel" politics claims 
                                                
129 For news accounts, see Amy Merrick and Kris Maher, Wisconsin Governor Seeks Deep Cuts, Wall 
Street Journal, March 2, 2011 (noting that on February 17, 2011 Democratic legislators had left the state 
and not yet returned); Bill Glauber, "Democrats flee state to avoid vote on budget bill," Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel, http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/116381289.html; Lila Shapiro, "Wisconsin Protests: 
State Police Pursue Democratic Lawmakers Boycotting Vote," Huffington Post, Feb 17 2011, updated May 
25, 2011.  
130 The Wisconsin Constitution authorizes each house to provide for the compulsory attendance of its 
members. See W.I. Const, art. IV, § 7. The 2011 Wisconsin Senate Rules stated that “[m]embers of the 
senate may not be absent from the daily session during the entire day without first obtaining a leave of 
absence,” granted by majority vote  and that the body can “compel the attendance of absent members.” 
Senate Rules 15, 16, adopted as part of 2011 Senate Resolution 2, adopted January 3, 2011, available at 
http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2011/related/rules/senate/. Permission to be absent was not given to the 
Democratic legislators. During the impasse, Senate Republicans held the Democrats in contempt, but the 
legality of this decision was questioned at the time. See Mary Spicuzza and Dee J. Hall, “Senate Orders 
arrest of missing Democrats,” Wisconsin State Journal, March 4, 2011, 
http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/senate-orders-arrest-of-missing-
democrats/article_8d9ad090-45bd-11e0-bf68-001cc4c03286.html.The walk-out was ultimately resolved by 
the Governor's re-submission of a bill concerning collective bargaining, removing certain fiscal measures, 
which enabled Republicans to pass it under rules not requiring a special majority and thus without the 
presence of the Democrats in the Senate. See Paul M. Secunda, The Wisconsin Public-Sector Labor 
Dispute of 2011, 27 ABAJ. Lab. & Emp. L. 293, 299 (2012).  The law thereby enacted was held invalid by 
a state trial court, whose judgment was then reversed by a four to three vote in the Wisconsin Supreme 
court (in an event linked to an alleged physical assault by one justice on another).   Voters who disagreed 
with the new law then procured a recall election, which resulted in a two-seat gain for the Democrats - not 
enough to secure repeal of the law. Id. at __.  
131 See supra note [60]. 
132 A proposed Gravina Island Bridge would have linked Gravina Island, with its roughly 50 residents and 
the Ketchickan airport, to Ketchikan, a town of about 8,000 on the Alaskan mainland, replacing an existing 
ferry service; the cost for the bridge at one time was reflected in a $398 million earmark. See generally 
Daneille Schlanger, Bridge to Nowhere Finally Scrapped in Favor of Ferries, Huffington Post, Aug 
8,2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/news/gravina-island-bridge/ [Carl Hulse, Two Bridges to Nowhere 
Tumble Down in Congress, N.YT Times (Nov. 17, 2005; Alaska; End Sought for Bridge to Nowhere, NY 
Times, 9/22/2007; Yereth Rosen, Palin Bridge to Nowhere Angers Many Alaskans, Reuters, 1/08]; Ronald 
Utt, Bridge to Nowhere: A National Embarrassment, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/10/the-
bridge-to-nowhere-a-national-embarrassment  
133  This is not to deny that some "pork" may funnel resources to those already highly advantaged or to 
projects that are detrimental to any reasonable understanding of a general public interest even within the 
Vicki Jackson   8/10/15 7:24 PM
Comment [1]: Waiting or RA to report on 
whether Wisconsins state law affirmatively 
required attendance at this time.  
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often involve assessment of comparative benefit, of where is there greater need for 
distribution of federal funds. This puts into tension the accountability to electoral 
constituents vs. accountability to national constituency, in settings where deferring to 
local constituents will often be more attractive and, arguably, in the long run more 
democracy serving. Because sometimes "pork barrel" or "log-rolling" exchanges may 
facilitate negotiations that allow projects to go forward that plainly benefit the national 
public interest, including such "side payments"134 in an overall legislative package might 
perhaps be understood as an important way in which democratic legislatures are able 
actually to "act." 
 
 
III. Pay Offs for Legal Education? 
 
I want to conclude by arguing that law schools and legal scholars should begin to 
rectify the relative lack of attention to good representation. I recognize that even if one 
thinks it would be good for people, generally, to be exposed to a broader range of 
thinking about what it means to be a good representative, a question may arise whether 
this really should have a significant role in a law school curriculum.   It might be thought 
that the idea of good representation falls within the domain of “politics,” which should be 
studied in political science departments or by political theorists or political philosophers. 
(Or in general civics classes.) In the day-to-day work for which we train lawyers, it might 
be argued, these questions are of little practical relevance.  
 
 Here are six possible reasons why it does matter that law schools do more in 
exposing students to complex normative discourses about representation.  I am not sure 
each is persuasive; and I suspect there are others. But here is a start.  
  
First, trying to specify what it means to be a “pro-constitutional ” elected 
representatives might shed interesting light on the different character of legislative 
bodies, and their members, in differently structured constitutional systems.  That is, being 
a “pro-constitutional” representative in the U.S. federal system at the national level may 
be quite different, or involve a different balance of “representational” roles and 
considerations, than being a “pro-constitutional” representative in a proportional 
representation (PR) system (or in a unicameral legislature). The role of representatives in 
a PR system, for example, might be thought to include larger elements of accountability 
to the political party on whose list the representative ran.  And, of course, in the absence 
of an individual constituency – as is typical in PR systems – no distinction would in 
                                                                                                                                            
constituency. See, e.g., Hardin, supra note__, at 37 (criticizing the compromise on funding to protect 
against domestic terrorism that allocated more than seven times as much, per capita, to Wyoming as to New 
York).  
134 On the positive role of "side payments" in public deliberative negotiations, see Warren & Mansbridge, 
supra, at __.  ("[T]he question as to whether trading is on balance good or bad often depends on the kinds 
of items and the kinds of trades.")  The authors locate the problem of pork and log-rolling in the literature 
on the benefits of expanding the subjects of negotiation to enhance the ability to reach agreement.  See also 
Jonathan Cohn, Roll Out the Barrel: The Case Against the Case Against Pork, in THE ENDURING DEBATE: 
CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS IN AMERICAN POLITICS  141 (David. T. Canon et al eds. 2d ed 
2000). But see Sean Paige, Rolling out the Pork Barrel, in THE ENDURING DEBATE, at 138 
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theory exist between the interests of a particular geographic constituencies and the 
interests of the country as a whole (though geographic concentrations of particular party 
members may produce a similar effect).   
 
Moreover, if differences in representation roles are associated with different kinds 
of elected legislative representatives, it might have implications, for example, for 
intentionalist theories of legislative interpretation: in parliamentary systems with national 
lists, one could imagine arguments directing more focus on political party agendas and 
less on statements of individual members in parliamentary systems.  And in a bicameral 
(rather than unicameral) legislative body, if one house has longer terms, that fact might 
imply a greater responsibility for independent deliberation. 135 
 
Further, in a parliamentary system with the ready possibility of new elections if 
the government in power loses the people’s confidence, the “pro-constitutional” role of 
members of the majority might be thought to weigh more heavily in favor of what acting 
in accord with what their constituents want or will accept in the near term, than would be 
the case, for example, for members of the Senate in the United States, who serve fixed six 
year terms designed to promote the ability to take a somewhat longer, more generally 
public spirited view. And the role of being a “pro-constitutional” minority member may 
be more importantly shaped --throughout the term in office -- by an understanding that 
members of the minority party must be prepared in the event that they need to take over 
actual governance; in a presidential system like the United States, terms of elected 
officials at the national level are fixed.  
 
 A related set of questions might explore links between degrees of political 
competitiveness and the responsibilities of representatives.  Although there is some 
disagreement on this point, the weight of recent scholarship suggests a decline in the 
degree of competitiveness within districts.136  In a more competitive district, 
representatives may feel more of an obligation to be responsive to constituents; in a less 
competitive districts, representatives may feel more freedom to act independently or to 
seek to influence constituencies to her views. Although there is some suggestion that 
even incumbents in "safe" districts do not feel safe, beyond this empirical question is the 
normative question of how the presence or absence of highly competitive districts affects 
the obligations of representatives which, in turn, raises further empirical and normative 
questions about the overall functioning of the legislative body.  
                                                
135 Differences between membership in the House and the Senate, within the U.S. Congress, have been 
often-remarked upon. See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove and Neil Devins, Congress's (Limited) Power to 
Represent Itself in Court, 99 Cornell L Rev, 571, 604-22 (2014). Do the lengthier terms in the senate 
suggest that more attention to the national perspective should be expected there, given the Senators greater 
independence from immediate electoral pressures, from a "pro-constitutional" Senator?  
136 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 Harv L Rev 593, 623-30 
(2002); Drew Desilver. For Most Voters Congressional Elections Offer Little Drama (Pew Research 
Center, November 3, 2014),  http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/11/03/for-most-voters-
congressional-elections-offer-little-drama; but cf. Nathan Persily, et al., The Complicated Impact of One 
Person, One Vote on Political Competition and Representation, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 1299, 1327 (2002); 
Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to 




Second, an enduringly important question in constitutional interpretive theory is 
the relevance of the position of other branches in evaluating the constitutionality of their 
action.  Whether this inquiry is framed in term of “deference,” or degree of certainty of 
constitutional error, or John Hart Ely’s theory of “representation reinforcement,” 
development and defense of these theories might be thought to call for an appreciation of 
both the normative aspirations of a representative government and its actual operations. 
For example, on Ely’s approach (very bluntly stated), courts should intervene most 
aggressively when the processes of representative democracy are blocked. Although this 
has traditionally been understood in terms of the exclusion of minorities from 
participation, it could be extended or understood in deeper or broader ways if we had a 
richer understanding of the normative aspirations for what a good representative does in a 
constitutional democracy.137 Moreover, as Dick Fallon has argued, what constitutional 
theory of judicial review one adopts should be based in part on some prediction whether 
that theory will on the whole yield better results than others.138  Evaluating the quality of 
representative institutions might thus be an aspect of choosing the right interpretive 
theory for a particular period.  
 
It is, to be sure,  possible that one could have a system that works reasonably well 
in producing democratic outcomes even if its component parts are unattractive.139 One 
could say that as long as there are elections, or contested elections, there is no need for 
normative theories of what good representatives do; the check of being voted out of 
office suffices to achieve acceptable levels of democratic functioning.  It is also possible 
to argue that constitutional interpretive theory might not vary depending on the quality of 
particular representatives in a legislative body but would instead depend on an evaluation 
of how a system of democratic deliberation and decisionmaking – including legislatures, 
media, civic society --  together work to produce legislation. Perhaps enough competing 
forces, all unattractively motivated and acting selfishly and without any normative 
aspirations other than maximizing their own self-interest, can produce a good enough and 
democratically legitimate set of laws.140 Thus, it could be argued, that an understanding 
of representation as something undertaken by particular persons called “representatives” 
(as “judging” is an activity undertaken by particular persons called “judges”) is simply 
not important for constitutional law – that what matters is some aggregate understanding 
of whether the legislature as a whole is representative or whether the overall system of 
which the legislature is a part meets some form of democratic criteria.   
 
                                                
137 For proposals that judicial review should vary depending on whether legislation was the product of 
divided or unified government (reflecting both the greater risks of overreach and the fewer incentives for 
careful checking when a single party dominates all organs in the legislative process, see Daryl J. Levinson 
& Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2312, 2312 (2006). For 
discussions of judicial review of the deliberative quality of legislative processes see David Landau, 
Political Institutions and Judicial Role in Comparative Perspective, 51 Harv. Int'l L. J. 319 (2010). 
138 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 534 (1999). 
139 See Vermeule, Foreword: System Effects, supra note __ at __ (discussing various combinations of  
offsetting "second bests").  
140 There are elements of this idea in some of Madison’s writing; and may be connected to more modern 
“competitive” or “pluralist interest group” understandings of  democracy.  
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But it seems unlikely that the kinds of “virtues,” attitudes, or “good conduct” to 
which representatives aspire, or at least some representatives aspire,141 would be 
irrelevant to how the legislative body worked as a part of that overall system.  Although 
institutional and economic structures no doubt play strong roles in producing the kind of 
Congress and congressional process we have, the possibility of legislative 
‘statesmanship’, motivated by a set of aspirations of what being a good representative in 
a constitutional democracy entails, should not be dismissed. Especially if one believes, 
generally, that representative should act on  behalf of the narrow interest of their 
constituency, downward spirals of conduct that are not in the collective self-interest may 
occur.  Whether one views the legislative process as best operating under pluralist interest 
group assumptions, deliberative democracy assumptions, or even critical structural 
reform assumptions,142  representatives in any of these modes will sometimes need to 
compromise with others of very different views; they will need to be responsive to their 
constituencies and provide and receive information; they will be asked if they are in the 
Congress to provide help to their constituents; and they will face many choices about how 
to participate in a government that works.  
 
Third, there may be some pay off for thinking about approaches to statutory 
interpretation.  If, for example, one conceives of legislators' duties as no more than 
advancing the interests of their constituents,  one might be more persuaded of the 
importance of treating legislation as reflecting presumptive compromises worthy of 
respect by the judiciary.143; on the other hand if one conceives of legislators' as having 
sometimes conflicting duties to their constituents' more private interests and to a 
conception of the public good that may transcend immediate understandings of the 
interests of the constituency, one might be more attracted to theories that seek to presume 
more public-regarding interpretations of ambiguous legislation.144 
 
 Fourth, paying more attention to what being a "good" representative means may 
heighten understanding of what being a good "judge" entails.  Is the opposition between 
the need for legislators to "compromise' and the importance of "principle" in judging 
correct? Should judges sometimes compromise with other judges, e.g., on appellate 
courts, to promote a more unified statement of the law? Do judges have more obligation 
than legislators to act consistently?  Or is the appeal of "equity" something that applies to 
both judges and legislators?145 
                                                
141 Without some numbers of members with sufficiently pro-constitutional attitudes (if not natural to them, 
then produced by fear of falling short of constituents,’ or media’ or fellow legislators’  expectations), a 
legislature might become simply a place of gridlock, or abuse.  The numbers needed might be small.  
142 See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 19-23 
(2000). 
143 Cf. Manning, supra note __ (viewing the Constitution as a bundle of compromises).  
144 Cf. e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: 
An Interest Group Model, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 223 (1986) (arguing, on the assumption that legislators act in 
response to "private interest" groups to the detriment of the public interest, for approaches to statutory 
interpretation that transform private interest driven legislation into more public interested law). 
145 Cf. Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton) (about how judges will temper, through interpretation, the otherwise 
unjust application of laws); Macey, supra note [126] at 226 (arguing that the "judiciary inevitably checks 
legislative excess" in statutory interpretation); Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS 




 Fifth, law school graduates will themselves be elected to political office, 
including as representatives, in disproportionate number.  Those of our students who will 
be judges have a rich and deep understanding of what core areas of agreement are about 
the normative expectation of judges; but much less so about the expectations of being a 
representative.  The opportunity to consider, analyze, apply, critique, and reflect critically 
about different normative theories of the obligations of elected representatives – to their 
constituents who voted for them, to all their constituents, to their political party, to the 
collegial body of which they are a part, to a broader community of which their district 
may be a part, to a particular policy agenda about which the representative deeply cares – 
can only enhance their ability conscientiously to balance the multiple pulls to which they 
will be subjected in performing their office.  
 
 Sixth, and concomitantly, the undernourished normative view that we provide 
about political representation and elected representatives – especially to the extent it is 
based on rational actor models that focus on re-election or forms of personal rent-seeking 
– may in its own small way contribute affirmatively to the pathologies of American 
constitutional democracy.146 Providing a more complex, realistic, and at the same time 
normatively aspirational view of political representation in scholarship, teaching and 
policy may in a small way contribute to a more healthy democratic politics.147  In order to 
have representatives who behave in “pro-constitutional” ways, we need to provide richer 
                                                                                                                                            
law is universal but about some things it is not possible to make a universal statement which will be 
correct. In those cases, then, in which it is necessary to speak universally, but not possible to do so 
correctly, the law takes the usual case, though it is not ignorant of the possibility of error.... When the law 
speaks universally, then, and a case arises on it which is not covered by the universal statement, then it is 
right, when the legislator fails us and has erred by over-simplicity, to correct the omission - to say what the 
legislator himself would have said had he been present .... And this is the nature of the equitable … "), 
quoted in Heidi Hurd, Justifiably Punishing the Justified, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 2203, 2204 (1992).  
146 Although some attribute the ills of democracy to citizen apathy, scholars of democracy report that 
citizen participation is on the rise. What has changed more, perhaps, is the decline of moderation and 
nonpartisanship as an organizing ideal, see Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, supra note __ at 823-24 
(summarizing data from Robert Putnam and others), and the increased polarization of elected 
representatives in legislatures, see Samuel Issacharoff, Collateral Damage: The Endangered Center in 
American Politics, 46 Wm & Mary L. Rev. 414 (2004).  See generally NOLAN MCCARTY, POLARIZED 
AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES (2006) (exploring simultaneous rise of income 
inequality and political polarization); BARBARA SINCLAIR, PARTY WARS: POLARIZATION AND THE POLITICS 
OF NATIONAL POLICY  MAKING (2006) (exploring reasons for increased polarization and noting its 
advantage in creating clearer choice between political parties, as well as its disadvantages). For an 
argument that "spatial homogeneity" in the distribution of voters within ditricts may decrease polarization, 
see Nicholoas Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 Harv L Rev. 1903 (2012)). While polarization may 
increase the sense of choice that voters have in choosing among candidates and parties, in extreme forms it 
can be debilitating to the ability of decisionmakers to compromise and - in its most extreme forms - can 
threaten the protection of basic human rights.  
147 Cf. Richard Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 936, 
938-39 (1991) (arguing that some social goals require subjective attitudes that may, or may not, be 
produced through public programs, and urging attention to the "cultural" consequences of 
"contractualization" of, e.g.,  military service or pro bono legal work). But cf. Richard Pildes, Why the 
Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 Calif. L. Rev. 273 (2011) 




and thicker accounts of the normative obligations of elected representatives, accounts that 
go beyond assumptions that behavior in the legislatures is unconstrained by anything 
other than each representative’s present self-interest in promoting his or her own 
reelection, power or wealth.148  By not teaching, or developing in our scholarship, richer 
normative accounts of elected political representation, but implicitly offering “rational 
actor” accounts that assume little to no public spiritedness on the part of elected 
representatives, or little or no commitment to the possibility of reasoned decisionmaking, 
are law schools contributing to a broader constitutional culture in which the only hope for 




Some may think it naïve to consider the possibility that having normative 
aspirations for being a good pro-constitutional" legislator may make some difference in 
behavior.  I think it naïve to disregard the effects of ideology, world-view and self-
understandings on behavior. A world-view that rests entirely on narrow definitions of 
immediate self-interest can lead, we know, to the loss of the common good. A world-
view that rests entirely on principles will result in the failure of representative 
government in a diverse and heterogeneous polity; but a world view without principled 
aspirations to serve the common goodmay also have this result.149  My hope is to 
encourage other constitutional lawyers, whether they accept or reject any particular 
arguments in this paper, to engage in a project central to the success of constitutional 
democracy -- the normative reconstruction of representation.   
 
                                                
148 Compare the debate over the filibuster and whether, when Democrats controlled the Sente, the should 
vote to change the filibuster rule by simple majority. [cite]   Some Democrats, it was reported, were 
concerned about the implications of such a move for a time when their party may be in the minority. [cite] 
Even if this concern were entirely self- interested, it illustrates the distinction suggested between “present” 
self-interest and a longer run perspective.  When thinking about the longer run, it might be argued, 
decisionmakers may become somewhat more public-spirited because their own future circumstances are 
less certain. [Cf Adrian Vermeule, Mechanisms of Democracy (2007) (discussing how putting off decisions 
to the future can function as a veil of ignorance rules and generally discussing small scale institutional 
design).] 
149 If Machiavelli's The Prince inverted the virtuous tradition of the "mirrors for princes" literatures [add 
cite to explanatory literature], with his effort to develop a special political ethics focused on effective 
maintenance of power in the governance of mostly nonvirtuous human beings, perhaps it is now timely for 
a corrective to Machiavelli's cynicism. With thanks to Clark Lombardy for bringing the "mirrors for 
princes" literature to my attention.  
